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ABSTRACT 
The central problem which is addressed by this 
thesis is that of attaining the goal of economic stabil-
ization through the utilization of fiscal policy. More 
specifically, the responsiveness of fiscal policy to the 
political and economic conditions which prevail in the 
provinces is examined. The central hypothesis is that 
fiscal policy instruments which are typically thought of in 
terms of economic stabilization policy are not utilized for 
such purposes. Rather, fiscal ecoromic stabilization policy 
at both the federal as well as the provincial levels is res-
ponsive to political conditions. To the extent that this 
hypothesis is an accurate reflection of reality, one of its 
major implications is then that federal-provincial coordin-
ation of fiscal policy is, at best, unlikely. This hypoth-
esis as well as its implications for federal-provincial 
coordination of fiscal stabilization policy is generally 
evidenced for the i960 to 1979 period. 
Chapter I generally outlines the extent to which 
federal fiscal stabilization policy has been practiced. In 
addition, the theoretical potential for provincial stabiliz-
ation policy to be utilized is also outlined in this chapter. 
Cnapter II develops the theoretical hy potheses which, in 
general, suggest that economic stabilization policy may be 
responsive to political rather than economic conditions. 
In Chapter III, several measures were developed as a means 
IV 
by wrier, the nypotneses ooali be verified. Although 
certainly not exhaustive of the number of possible oper-
ational indicators of stabilization policy, five measures 
of fiscal stabilization policy were developed. These 
measures include both aggregate budgetary indicators as 
well a;- more pro^ramatic measures of actual policy dir-
ection rather than articulated policy intent. Based on 
these measures, indicators of federal-provincial coordinat-
ion of fisral <;tp' . "* ' "»^  -".. -"" ' v v~ ~ ''• ••. " -' 
In Chapter IV, the responsiveness of the measures 
of stabilization policy to the political and economic con-
ditions within the provinces was examined. Although some 
policy responsiveness to economic conditions of unemployment 
and low economic growth was evident, on balance, stabiliz-
ation policy was found to be quite highly responsive to the 
political conditions within the provinces. This may be 
taken as evidence for the hypothesis that incumbent govern-
ments stimulate the economy in an effort to attain electoral 
success. To the extent that the measures of policy 
responsiveness utilized are reflective of at least potential 
policy effect, if not articulated policy, tne consistency 
of this finding across provinces and between levels of 
government implies at least that the prospects for economic 
stabilization are not particularly bright unless a ma^or 
change in government priorities takes place. To the extent 
that electoral success is a goal of most, if not all, 
political parties, such a change does not appear to be 
entirely likely. 
v 
however, although this thesis implies that economic 
stimulation leads to electoral success for incumbent govern-
ments, this implication should be dealt with in more detail 
in future research. Indeed, this thesis indicates only that 
economic stabilization policy is related to electoral con-
ditions and not that such policy has necessarily been 
effective in 'buying' votes. 
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CiLAPIEri I 
STATEMENT OF THE PR03LEM 
a) Introduction: 
The failure of fiscal policy at the federal level 
in Canada to successfully stabilize the economy has been 
1 
reasonably well documented. Studies of fiscal policy at 
the provincial level have, however, tended to be largely 
conceptual in nature and primarily concerned with the capa-
city of the provincial governments to actively engage in 
2 
economic stabilization. In addition, there is an expan-
ding body of literature which suggests that economic sta-
bilization in Canada may only be achieved by coordinatei 
3 
federal and provincial policy action. However, the ex-
tent to which one may realistically expect coordination 
of federal and provincial policy action in terms of sta-
bilization is not entirely clear. Indeed, if fiscal pol-
icy has not been entirely adequate at the federal level 
itself, it is difficult to imagine how fiscal policy may 
be adequate at both the federal and provincial levels as 
well as coordinated between governments. 
I-evertheless, although perhaps unrealistic, the 
theoretical case for intergovernmental coordination of 
fiscal policy appears to be quice strong as does the 
-2-
theoretical case for regionally differentiated stabili-
zation policy in Canada, however, to the extent that, as 
D.A.L. Auld notes, "the evidence on the perversity of 
(federal) ficcal policy is fairly clear," then "a careful 
4 
analysis of why policy was inadequate would be fruitful," 
I his chapter briefly outlines the major consider-
ations of the goal of economic stabilization from a policy 
perspective and indicates the extent to v.'hich this goal has 
been achieved at the federal level. The theoretical case 
for provincial stabilization policy and federal-provincial 
coordination of stabilization policy is then developed. 
With respect to the Canadian economy, the ability of the 
provincial governments to effectively practice stabili-
zation policy is then addressed with particular reference 
to the fiscal capacities of the provinces and the constitu-
tional limitations or. the practice of stabilization policy 
at the provincial level. 
b) "ihe Stabilization Goal: 
fhe goal of economic stabilization is generally 
recognized as the goal of smoothing out fluctuations in 
the business or trade cycle and was originally popularized 
5 
as a legitimate goal of government by J.M. Keynes. In es-
sence, Keynes postulated that the rcle of government in 
tnis regard was to stimulate the economy during recessions 
in an effort to proviae employment and growth opportunities 
-3-
which otherwise would not have been present. During in-
flationary times, the role of government war to contract 
the economy in order to reduce inflationary pressure. 
Based on the principle of effective demand, or that unem-
ployment was the result of insufficient aggregate demand 
in the ecoromy and inflation the result of excessive aggre-
gate demand for goods and services, Keynes indicated that 
governments could and should effectively manage demand for 
goods and services. Primarily, demand management policy in 
the Keynsian framework consisted of deficit financing gov-
ernment expenditure in recessionary times and maintaining 
a budgetary surplus in periods of high economic growth or 
inflation such that, in the long run at least, government 
budgets would tend toward the balanced position. 
The utilization of fiscal (budgetary) policy to 
achieve the stabilization goal therefore clearly requires 
the appropriate manipulation of government revenues and 
expenditures in order to achieve the proper budgetary 
position in view of the economic circumstances. However, 
some consideration must be given to the types of taxation 
and expenditure undertaken by governments. Increased gov-
ernment expenditures or. goods and services not produced 
in the domestic economy will, for example, have very little, 
if any, effect on domestic levels of employment. Further-
more, monetary policy which permits appropriate conditions 
for investment should oe utilized m conjunction with fis-
cal policy. For example, it makes little economic sense 
-4-
to contract the economy by restricting the availability 
of money for new investment during recessionary periods 
since a 'tight money' policy tends to raise interest rates 
and thereby reduce the marginal efficiency of investment 
7 
capital. 
In addition to fiscal and monetary policy, govern-
mental regulations may also have an impact on economic 
3 
stabilization. Indeed, a policy of increasing minimum 
wages may, for example, be inappropriate in recessionary 
times to tne extent that the wage is set above the level 
at which it is efficient for business enterprises to hire 
additional labour or even retain the existing labour force, 
A further distinction should be made regarding 
automatic and discretionary policy with respect to economic 
9 
stabilization. Automatic stabilizers may be defined as 
existing policy instruments which tend to increase or de-
crease levels of taxation or expenditures in conjunction 
with economic conditions. For example, such social wel-
fare expenditures as unemployment insurance and welfare 
tend to increase as the unemployment rate increases. Dis-
cretionary policy is then policy which is formulated in 
specific response to prevailing conditions. In terms of 
stabilization, such a policy may be that of increasing 
government expenditures on such programs as building roads 
in order to provide employment opportunities which would 
otherwise not have existed during a recessionary period. 
-5-
In theory tnen, economic stabilization is widely 
recognized as a legitimate function of government and is 
typically identified as consisting of the goals of full 
employment, an adequate rate of economic prowth and a 
reasonable degree of price level stability, '^ enerall\ , 
the means by which these goals may be achieved by govern-
ment are typically enumerated as fiscal (taxation and ex-
penditure) oolicy, monetary policy and, to some extent, 
11 
regulatory legislation. Economic s.utilization is not, 
however, the only function of government nor is it tne 
only economic function of government. Trceec, the- econo-
mic functions of allocation and distribution are also tra-
ditionally viewed as legitimate economic functions of
 c,ov-
ernmer.t which are, or may be, facilitated through the uti-
12 
lization of fiscal, monetary and regulatory policy tools. 
Moreover, although the allocation, distribution ana stabi-
lization functions of government are generally concerned 
with the specific policy targets of providing public goods, 
ensuring equity in the distribution of income and moder-
ating fluctuations in the business cycle respectively, 
these policy targets tend to be interrelated in effect if 
not in intent. Indeed, a policy designed to have a redis-
tricutive effect through decreasing taxation of the 'poor1 
may also have a stabilization effect to the extent that the 
'poor* increase their expenditures on goods and services 
but government does not alter its expenditures despite the 
-o-
reduced tax revenue. Similarly, a stabilization policy 
which increases government expenditures on such public 
works programs as the construction of roads will have an 
allocation effect as the stock of public goods increases. 
Nevertheless, although the stabilization goal is 
not strictly independent of the allocation and distri-
bution functions of government, in terms of fiscal policy, 
stabilization is concerned more with the mix between the 
level of taxation and the level of expenditures than with 
the incidence of such taxation or the placement of such 
expenditures. Generally, if government revenues exceed 
government expenditures, the economic effect of such fiscal 
policy is contractionary as the government is withdrawing 
more money from the economy than it is returning. Simi-
larly, if expenditures exceed revenues, the fiscal policy 
effect is, on aggregate, expansionary whether or not the 
expenditures or taxes alter the distrubution of income or 
the allocation of public goods. Of course, from a stabi-
lization perspective, some consideration may be given to 
the incidence of taxation and the placement of expenditures. 
The reduction of taxation of individuals who are not likely 
to spend any increased disposable income will have less of 
an immediate effect on levels of economic activity than a 
similar reduction of individual taxes on those with a rela-
tively higher marginal propensity to consume. Similarly, 
increased government expenditures on goods and services 
-7-
which are imported from foreign sources are not likely to 
have as grnat an expansionary effect on the domestic eco-
nomy as increased expenditures on locally produced goods 
and services. 
Furthermore, within the stabilization function it-
self, the various goals of stabilization policy are not 
necessarily compatable. Indeed, the ongoing debate between 
the Keynsian and the Monetarist schools of economic thought 
is concerned not only with the proper roles for fiscal and 
monetary oolicy but also with whether or not a long-run 
13 
trade-off exists between inflation and unemployment. 
Nevertheless, economic stabilization is generally 
recognized as at least one of the goals which governments 
may persue. However, the current coexistence of high in-
flation, unemployment and interest rates in Canada, coupled 
with low economic growth and generally depressed stock 
prices does not tend to indicate that stabilization policy 
has been particularly successful in achieving any of its 
economic goals, at least in the Canadian case. 
c) Federal Stabilization Policy: 
In the period following World War II, there is a 
widely held belief that Keynsian principles of aggregate 
demand management have, by and large, prevailed in Ottawa 
14 
insofar as the stabilization goal is concerned. However, 
15 
in terms of fiscal policy, various studies ranging from 
-8-
comparative qualitative analyses of articulated budgetary 
intent and actual policy direction to more quantitative 
analyses of potential policy impact have indicated that 
federal fiscal policy has been less than adequate more of-
ten than not. According to calculations by W.I. Gillespie, 
even the most generous of the assessments of federal fiscal 
policy in the post-war period indicates that it was 'ade-
quate' only 37 percent of the time insofar as the stabili-
16 
zation goal is concerned. 
Defining 'adequate' fiscal policy as policy in the 
correct direction and of sufficient magnitude to have a 
stabilization effect, 'inadequate' policy as policy in the 
correct direction but of insufficient magnitude, and 'per-
verse' policy as any policy in the incorrect direction 
17 
(destabilizing), Gillespie notes that the least generous 
of federal fiscal policy action assessments indicate per-
13 
versity 42 percent of the time. r,ven in ,,«•>;*..c of stated 
policy objective as articulated by various Ministers of 
Finance and outlined in budgetary documents as compared to 
actual policy effect, Gillespie notes that federal govern-
ment fiscal policy has never been unambiguously adequate in 
the I960 to 1975 period. 
Moreover, as outlined in Table 1.1, even if federal 
fiscal policy is reclassified in terms of its mere direc-
tion as either appropriate or perverse, such policy may 
be evaluated as being appropriate only somewhat more often 
SUMMARY OF EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL POLICY PERFORMANCE: 
1945-75 
Evaluat i on: I Study; 
'Years 
Royal 
Commis- , 
ion on Will 
Taxation 
Gordon lAuld 
Economic 
Council 
of 
Canada 
Curtis 
and 
Kitchen 
j Examined: 1954-63 ; 1945-63 1945-63 [1957-67 (1965-7** ,1953 
Adequate ., 
'Inadequate 
! 
i 
1
 Perverse ., 
Ambiguous . 
20 
30 
30 
(Percentage of Observations) 
-71 
Gillespie 
1960-75 
31 
26 
36 
7 
21 
36 
42 
11 
56 
33 
33 
45 
22 
1 
i 
j 37 
! 21 
I 42 
0 
86 
7 
7 
i'otal 
Total Observations (N) . 
100 
(10) 
I 100 
! (19) 
: t 
Appropriate Direction"^ , 
3 
Perverse Direction 
t value for difference 
from random expectation 
(E(y) = .50r 
70 
30 
j 1.38* 
.J 
61 
39 
0.96 
100 
(19) 
57 
43 
O.62 
100 
(9) 
67 
33 
I.09 
100 
(9) 
! 100 
(19> 
100 
(15) 
=4= 
78 
22 
58 
42 
2.03** :0.71 
93 
7 
6.31*** 
1. The Economic Council of Canada evaluated aggregate fiscal policy for all levels 
of government in Canada. 
2. Gillespie's results are for a comparision of actual budget direction to stated 
budget intent regardless of the appropriateness of the intent to the economic conditions. 
3. Ambiguous evaluations are not included in these calculations. 
4. Random expectation is defined as 50^ perverse and 50,^  appropriate. 
* Significant at .10; **Significant at .05; ***Significant at .001 (one-tailed test). 
Source: W. Irwin Gillespie, "Postwar Canadian Fiscal Policy hevisted, 1945-1975", 
Canadian Tax Journal, 27 No. 3 (May-June 1979). fable 1. 
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than not. If one applies a one-tailed t-test to these 
results, however, only very limited support exists for the 
hypothesis that federal fiscal policy has been appropriate 
in direction more often than not, insofar as the econcuiic 
conditions arc- concerned. Indeed, although the Gillespie 
results in iable 1.1 indicate reasonably consistent appro-
priate policy direction, these results do not take into 
account actual economic conditions. Furthermore, the Eco-
nomic Council of Canada results are for all levels of 
government rather than for only federal fiscal policy and, 
as such, are not entirely comparable to the other studies. 
Hence, if one may expect fiscal policy to be appropriate 
in direction 50 percent of the time by random occurrance, 
these results do not tend to indicate that federal fiscal 
policy has not been 'randomly' distributed between appro-
priate (stabilizing) and perverse (destabilizing) economic 
impact in the postwar period. 
In addition to the problems of perversity or at 
least the general inadequacy of federal fiscal policy in 
dealing with economic stabilization in the postwar period, 
problems have also existed in coordinating monetary policy 
to the stabilization goal as well as to fiscal policy 
19 
action. Indeed, as L. Officer and L. Smith indicate, 
one of the major constraints on monetary policy was the 
somewhat erratic adherence of the federal government to a 
fixed exchange rate for the Canadian dollar in terms of 
11 
20 
U.S. funds. however, even under floating exchange 
21 
rates, Canadian monetary policy has not necessarily been 
appropriate in terms of stabilization. Indeed, Officer 
and Smith note that "in the late 1950's and until 196l, 
the Bank of Canada pursued a restrictive monetary policy, 
22 
irrespective of the state of the economy." Generally, 
in discussing Canadian postwar stabilization policy at 
the federal level, G. Reuber's conclusion seems appropriate: 
"... the indictment of conventional mone-
tary and fiscal policy can hardly be that 
it was tried and didn't work. Indeed dur-
ing much of this period these conventional 
levers appear to have been moved in the 
wrong direction ..." 23 
Kence, although it is possible to assert that fis-
cal and monetary policies have failed to achieve the goal 
of economic stabilization in Canada, this failure appears 
to be less a function of policy failure per se, and more a 
function of the failure to consistently apply fiscal and/or 
monetary policy to the stabilization goal. Clearly, it is 
premature to indict a policy or to dispense with a theore-
tical policy framework if it has not been utilized. The 
indictment, if any, should rather be directed toward the 
fiscal and monetary authorities who failed to utilize the 
tools at their disposal to achieve appropriate economic 
goals. 
However, with respect to federal fiscal policy, 
Gillespie notes that "While it is clear ... that contra-
cyclical economic budgeting failed, it is less obvious 
-12-
24 
why it failed so persistently." D.A.L. Auld ' 
concern with the reasons for the failure of fe 
policy and indicates that "the evidence on the perve±^ 
of fiscal policy is fairly clear, suggesting that a care-
ful analysis of why policy was inadequate would be fruit-
25 
ful." Unfortunately, although Auld and Gillespie do 
suggest some tentative reasons for the apparent failure 
of stabilization policy, neither is able to offer what 
Gillespe terms "a positive model of government behavior 
capable of accounting for historical budgetary policy and 
26 
predicting future budgetary policy," 
d) The Theory of Provincial Stabilization Policy: 
hn expanding body of literature suggests that the 
provincial governments in Canada have the capacity to ef-
fectively practice fiscal stabilization policy at least to 
27 
some extent. however, the conviction that "the use of 
fiscal policy for stabilization purposes has to be at the 
28 
national (central) level" still tends to prevail in the 
literature on stabilization policy. 
Generally, the case against provincial government 
stabilization policy is based on three major theoretical 
29 
considerations: 
(1) Local or provincial governments do 
not have access to monetary policy and as 
such are in a weaker position to effec-
tively stabilize the economy than is the 
national (central) government. 
-13-
(2) Even if fiscal policy was utilized 
to attempt to stabilize the provincial 
economies, it could not be effective as 
the provincial economies are character-
istically 'open1, nence, a high pro-
portion of increased expenditures in one 
province is likely to be spent on goods 
imported from other provinces. Such inter-
provincial leakages are likely to offset 
the stimulation effect of any increases 
in government expenditures or reduction 
in taxes and lead to the stimulation of 
'foreign' economies. 
(.3) The capacity for provincial govern-
ments to deficit finance is severely con-
strained by their inability to raise funds 
on the capital markets relative to the 
capacity of the national (central) govern-
ment. Moreover, if the provincial govern-
ment is successful in raising capital on 
the open market, the high mobility of capi-
tal dictates that, in the long run, some 
of this debt will be held by non-residents 
and the eventual repayment of the debt to 
non-residents implies eventual contraction 
of the local economy. 
lo the extent that these arguments hold, a strong 
theoretical case may therefore be made for exclusive cen-
tral government control of stabilization policy. 
The case for the practice of stabilization policy 
at the provincial level is not, however, based on the out-
right rejection of the centralization arguments. It is 
rather argued that the problems which may be associated 
with provincial government stabilization policy are, as 
C. Barber indicates, generally problems of degree rather 
30 
than of kind and are certainly not insurmountable. 
Generally, the theoretical case for the possibility of 
provincial stabilization policy is based on a modification 
-14-
of the three major considerations which were forwarded 
as the case against provincial stabilization policy: 
(1) Although the provincial governments 
do not have access to monetary policy, they 
do have access to fiscal policy instruments 
and, as such, are not entirely prohibited 
from practicing stabilization policy. 
(2) To the extent that import leakages 
constitute a problem, expenditures for 
stabilization purposes may be directed 
towards goods and services with a high 
'local' content. Moreover, in the first 
instance, taxation policy will always have 
an impact on the local or provincial eco-
nomy. 
(3) Although the provincial governments 
do not have the same ability as the federal 
government to service a high level of public 
debt, they do possess some ability to raise 
capital and, as such, are not seriously con-
strained from deficit financing. 
In itself, however, the theoretical possibility of 
provincial stabilization policy does not necessarily imply 
that such policy is either desirable or required from an 
economic perspective. Rather, the economic desirability 
of provincial stabilization policy or provincially differ-
entiated stabilization policy will depend upon the extent 
to which the provincial economies differ in terms of their 
stabilization needs and the extent to which national sta-
bilization policy has been effective. 
Generally, in terms of regionally or provincially 
differentiated stabilization policy, a strong case may be 
forwarded for its practice to the extent that differing 
economic conditions prevail in each region and that the 
-ir_ 
regional economies are reasonably closed in terms of 
their propensity to import goods and services for domestic 
consumption. 
For illustrative purposes, it may be assumed that 
a trade-off exists between inflation and unemployment (the 
Phillips curves) and that a nation state is composed of 
two entirely closed economies characterized by equal popu-
lations and gross domestic products, but differing inf-
lation and unemployment rates as a result of regionally 
unique economic structures. Therefore, by assumption, re-
gionally unique Phillips rurvp? exist and national infla-
tion and unemployment rates are, in this case, simply the 
31 
averages of the regional rates. 
In terms of policy, if, as in Figure 1.1 , Region 
A begins at point PA1 and UA1 in terms of inflation and 
unemployment respectively on its Phillips run" aw* region 
B is initially characterized by inflation PHI and unem-
ployment UBl, the national inflation and unemployment rates 
are PN1 and UNI respectively. If, however, the national 
government undertakes stabilization policy to reduce unem-
ployment to, say UN2, the national inflation rate will be-
come PN2. Assuming that this trade-off is acceptable and 
that the stabilization policy is not regionally differen-
tiated, in Region B, the unemployment and inflation rates 
become UB2 and PB2 and rates UA2 and PA2 will prevail in 
Region A. The cost of such a policy is, however, very 
Figure 1.1 
A Model of Regional .Phillip* Curves 
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high inflation in xtegion b but a relatively small reduc-
tion in the unemployment rate in this region, negion A 
clearly benefits in terms of a lower unemployment rate 
than would otherwise prevail but its inflation rate is 
increased to some extent. 
Interestingly, the same goal of achieving UN2 
could be achieved by stimulating Region A'S economy to the 
point of UA3, TA3 with a national cost in inflation terms 
of only UN3. J-he resultant unemployment rate, U?3, is 
not, however, on the national aggregate Phillips curve 
and, as such, the national Phillips curve may actually 
change in slope as a result of regionally differentiated 
stabilization policy, say, from the initial Nl-Nl curve 
to N2-N2. 
.allowing for the existence of regionally identical 
Phillips curves but non-identical regional positions on 
the curves does not significantly deter from the general 
effectiveness of regionally differentiated stabilization 
policy. Furthermore, although the existence of some inter-
regional trade leakages will tend to lead to some inter-
regional transmission of inflation and unemployment, the 
case for regionally differentiated stabilization policy 
is not substantially weakened to the extent that inter-
regional trade does not constitute a major proportion 
of regional gross domestic product. 
Extension of this simple model to more than two 
regions is, of course, possible without a less of 
-18-
TABLB 1.2 
Prov inc ia l Economic Condit ions , 1961-1979 Averages 
Province 
or Region 
-
N ewfoundland 
P r i n c e Edward I . 
Nova S c o t i a 
New Brunswick 
Quebec 
On ta r i o 
Manitoba 
Saskatchewan 
A l b e r t a 
B r i t i s h Columbia 
ATLANTIC 
PRAIRIE 
•
H
« 1 © 
>»+> 
O t6 
P, 
B - P 
« C 
B% 
1 1 . 1 4 
8 .74 
8 .81 
8 .51 
7 .42 
4 . 7 0 
4 . 5 0 
3 .31 
4 .07 
6.87 
8.90 
3.97 
c 0 
•H 
•P 
* M 
H « 
G CI 
M « 
\ 4 . 6 9 
\8 .16 
fc.44 
4,. 53 4\54 
4A72 
4.B5 
4.4\0 
4.6fc 
4 .67 
4 . 5 1 
4 .64 
£ — £ 
+> >*. .p ~ 
* >-» S: V! 
O 89 O O •*-* 
h fflrl-P U .. 
o p + s g 0 *• ai «> 
- U m 3 « -p e 
H O «*B H h f ^ O 4 e o <i 0,0 
*M O Q O , « 0 O M 
6.4^ 5.87 
2 .95 2 .81 
5.77 5.45 
5.95 5.76 
5.60 5.48 
•4^ ffc>. C & 
7.24 6.06 
9 .26 4 .94 
7.22 4 .26 
cj 0 
•p 0 
•H H A tt 
at » al 
0 e-d 
0 at 
h o c « fl as A t M O 
68.0 
6 7 . I 
79 .4 
74.9 
9 3 . 1 
109 .4 
*93*1-
92 .2 ! 
104.4 i 
110 .1 1 
i 
1. Prior to 1966, Statistics Canada reported unemploy-
ment rates on a regional basis only. Pre 1966 rates were 
estimated by extrapolation of the post 1965 linear relation-
ship between the provincial and regional rates on the basis 
of the following regression equations where: Y = the pro-
vincial unemployment rate and X = the regional unemployment 
rate. 
Newfoundland Y = -1.197 + 1.413 X F=223.64 
Prince Edward I. Y = 4.298 + 0.495 X F= 6.79 
Nova Scotia Y = -0.615 + 0.897 X F=299.86 
New Brunswick Y = -1.645 + 1.317 X F=449.48 
Manitoba Y = -0.032 + I.I69 X F= 85.99 
Saskatchewan Y = -0.068 + I.I69 X. F= 51.76 
Alberta Y = 0.001 + 1.049 X F=108.72 
R2=.95 
R2=.38 
R2=.96 
R2=.97 
R2=.88 
R2=.8l 
R2=.90 
2. Based on the unweighted average rate of inflation 
for regional cities in the provinces. Prince Edward Is-
land rates were not avialable prior to 1974. Pre 1975 rates 
were estimated on the basis of the relationship between the 
average regional rate and the provincial rate in the post 
1974 period. 2 
Y = 6.883 « 0.416 X F= 47.70 R =.94 
Sourcej Based on data from Statistics Canada, Histor-
ical Labour Force Statistics-Actual Data, Seasonal Factors 
Seasonally Adjusted Data, 1978. (Ottawa: Industry, Trade 
and Commerce, 1979), pp. 105-110, and Canada, Department of 
Finance, Economic Review. (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 
1976, 1979). 
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generality. If, however, the model is extended to allow 
for regional governments as well as for a national govern-
ment, the problem of a lack of coordination policy becomes 
readily apparent. If for example, the national government 
undertakes to reduce unemployment on the initial national 
Phillips curve h 1-1*1 to U\2 from bhl but the government 
of Region A undertakes to reduce regional inflation say to 
PA4, even in the case of regionally differentiated national 
stabilization policy, the contradictory objectives of the 
two governments will result in neither objective being 
achieved in its entirety and the extent to which either 
objective is achieved will depend on the relative magni-
tude of each policy's potential impact. 
e) Provincial Stabilization Policy: 
In the Canadian case, although well-documented 
elsewhere, Table 1.2 indicates the diversity of the Cana-
32 
dian economy on a regional and provincial basis. The 
wide ^ differences; between provinces in terms of average 
unemployment rates and per capita income indicate that 
regionally or provincially differentiated stabilization 
policy may be called for. Indeed, decreasing unemployment 
rates and increasing per-capita income in the Atlantic pro-
vinces may well be an appropriate policy goal for the 
33 
federal as well as the provincial governments to pursue. 
however, in itself, such a goal does not necessarily entail 
TABLE: 1.3 
t-test for Differences Between Average Unemployment Rates Between Provinces 
and Regions, 1961-1979* 
Province 
or Region 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1 . i \ f l d . 4 . 5 6 3 .89 4 . 6 8 7 . 0 4 . 1 2 . 6 3 1 3 . 5 5 1 6 . 1 9 1 6 . 2 0 8 .36 4 . 3 3 
2 . p . b . I . - . 0 1 3 0 . 5 1 3 . 1 5 1 0 . 1 b 1 1 . 3 9 1 4 . 9 2 1 2 . 8 5 4 . 7 0 0 . 0 4 
3 . K . S . 0 . 5 4 2 . 6 8 8 .22 8 .97 1 1 . 4 5 1 0 . 0 1 3 .88 0 . 1 6 
4 . I . . B . 2 .29 8 . 3 5 9 . 2 2 1 2 . 1 7 1 0 . 4 0 3 .59 - 0 . 4 2 
5. <*"P. 6 . 5 4 7 . 4 5 1 0 . 7 2 8 . 7 4 1.32 - 2 . 7 8 
6 . 0 ... 0 . 5 5 3 . 9 1 0 . 2 3 - 5 . 5 2 - 8 . 9 4 
7 . M-n. 3 .75 1 .36 - 6 . 0 1 - 1 0 . 0 4 
8 . S a c k . - 2 . 4 0 - 9 . 9 4 - 1 2 . 8 3 
9 . A ] t a . - 7 . 8 ? - 1 1 . 0 8 
1 0 . . 1 : . - ^ . 1 ? 
1 1 . ILAL l i C 
1 2 . A U l n l . : . 
12. 
14.87 
13.18 
10.25 
10.67 
9.04 
2. 06 
1.68 
-2.10 
0.31 
8.14 
1.1 . 30 
CANADA 
10.64 
V. ^ 1 
6.21 
6.14 
4.13 
-2.')0 
-3.29 
-6.60 
-4.49 i 
2.93 ] 
i 
1 
6.70 j 
-4.79 I 
i 
0 
1 
:i
-t statistics 
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regionally differentiated stabilization policy as such 
and may rather be acnieved by the redistributive means 
which Jcey Smallwood termed 
"the Robin Hood policy of taking from 
the rich and giving to the poor, using 
the revenue collected from the main 
sources of revenue in Canada to speed 
up development in the other parts of 
Canada." 34 
Nevertheless, such a policy (although redistri-
butive in origin) will have a regionally differentiated 
stabilization effect to the extent that it entails stimu-
lating the economy of a region, while at least in the first 
instance, contracting that of another. 
In terms of regional or provincial inflation rates, 
however, regionally differentiated stabilization policy 
does not appear to be required since these rates are gene-
rally consistent across Canada. This may indicate that 
inflation in Canada is of a cost-push rather than demand-
35 
pull variety, or at least is not responsive to structu-
ral variations in provincial economies. Indeed a two-
tailed t-test for differences among average inflation 
rates across provinces and regions in the i960 to 1979 
period did not yield any statistically significant results 
at the .05 level. However, with respect to unemployment 
rates, the t-values of a similar i<-«i ,1^ ,^ ?, itl ^*ilr> i.i 
and statistically significant results <r. <
 Ut ..^ L ~..1J 
among regions but among provinces within the regions. 
1'ABLh. 1.4 
t - t e s t for Di f ferences Between Mean Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Product 
and for Per Capi ta Income Between P rov inces , 1961-1979* 
Province 
1 . i . f ld . 
3 . h»o, 
4 . N . B . 
5. tyje. 
6. ont . 
7 . N , , | n . 
8. Si*:*. 
9 . A' i">. 
10. . ' ' . 
13 . 
3 . 4 . 5. 6. _^  7. _ 8. 9 . 10. 1 1 . 
5.08 0.60 0.77 2.90 2.39 0.00 1.28 2.19 - 1 . 0 ; 
3.45 -3 .59 -3 .62 - 1 . 8 6 -1 .72 -2 .92 - 2 . 9 4 -1 .86 - 0 . 0 1 
s - 0 .37 - 0 . 2 3 2.09 1.65 -0 .91 0.39 1.43 -3 .0? 
0 . 3 4 ^ \ 0 .14 2 .33 1.89 -0 .69 0.70 1.68 -2 .30 
0.19 0.51 \ 2.32 1.84 - 0 . 7 4 0.60 1.63 2.69 
0 .01 0.34 -0 .17 \ - 0 . 1 1 - 2 . 0 3 - 1 . 5 3 - o . ? 9 5.91 
1.11 1.35 0.91 1.0b \ - 1 .86 - 1 . 2 1 -0 .17 2.17 
1.95 - 1 . 6 8 - 2 . 0 5 - 1 . 9 3 - 2 . 6 1 \ l . l l 1.73 0.22 
5.35 - 4 . 8 3 -5 .42 - 5 . 2 3 -5 .95 - 2 . 0 8 \ 1.02 3.16 
2.75 -2 .28 - 2 . 8 6 -2 .67 - 3 . 5 6 0.02 2.70 ^ 1.9? 
v 
0.78 - 2 . 2 3 - 0 . 4 3 - 0 . 1 0 - 1 . 2 3 -0 .69 -1 .97 0.63 2.70 2 .53 
GHOJrf DOMfcaUC PtiODUCT 
'
rt s t a t i s t i c s 
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Similarly, statistically significant results of 
t-tests among provinces and within regions were found to 
exist in terms of real growth rates of gross domestic pro-
duct and per capita income as indicated in Table 1.4. 
Although this data merely supports the generally 
evident hypothesis that there are economic differences 
among provinces as well as among regions, it also implies 
that provincially differentiated stabilization policy may 
be warranted. In addition, this data also implies that 
the generally accepted five-region classification of Canada 
(the Atlantic provinces, Quebec, Ontario, the rraiii^ I'jn, 
vinces and British Columbia) tends to understate the very 
36 
real differences among the provincial economies. 
however, from Cable 1.4, although statistically 
significant difference? between the national and provincial 
aggregrate real growth rates of gross domestic product 
and per capita income are apparent, the general movement 
of all provincial economic indicators with tne national 
indicators as shown in fable 1.5 suggests that a reasonably 
homogenous business cycle exists interprovincially in terms 
of timing if not level. Hence, the cyclical variations 
in national inflation, unemployment and growth rates indi-
cated in Figure 1.2 for the i960 to 1979 period tend to 
be reasonably consistent across Canada with the main dif-
ferences among provinces being in the prevailing rates of 
unemployment and growth, Jhis data tends to suggest that 
- 2 4 -
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Figure 1.2 
National Inflation, Unemployment and Heal Growth Rates 
of Gross National Expendiure, Canada, 1951-1978 
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— -—- Unemployment Rate Real Growth Rate 
Source: Data from Statistics Canada, Prices and Price 
Indlcies and Historical Labour Force Statistics and 
from Department of Finance, Economic Review! 
(Ottawa: Supply and Services, various years) 
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national aggregate stabilization policy may be of some 
utility in modifying the general business cycle but that 
provincially differentiated policy may be appropriate 
in terms of altering provincial levels of growth and 
unemployment. Moreover, insofar as Gillespie is accurate 
in his assessment tnat federal government fiscal policy 
has generally been inadequate at the national aggregate 
37 
level, the movement of the provincial economies with the 
national economy implies that federal fiscal policy has 
also been inappropriate insofar as the provinces ar<= con-
cerned, furthermore, this general movement of the provin-
cial economic indicators with the national indicators 
also implies that the provinces are not actively or at 
least successfully engaging in economic stabilization 
policy. 
The movement of the provincial economies with the 
national economy may, however, be explained by a number 
of factors which are unrelated to whether or not the pro-
vinces attempt to stabilize their own economy. Perhaps the 
most theoretically appealing explanation of this pheno-
menon is the potential for import leakages in the provin-
cial economies. As noted previously, to the extent that 
such leakages exist, the economic impact of increased 
expenditures in a province will tend to be diffused to 
other regions or provinces to a greater or lesser degree 
depending upon the relative value of such imports in the 
-27-
provincial economy. However, as indicated in Table 1.6, 
the Department of Regional Economic Expansion estimates 
that between 55 percent and 86 percent of the benefits to 
provincial income from a tax reduction within a province 
remain within that province. In addition, between 53 per-
cent and 83 percent of an increase in construction expen-
ditures were found to have an impact on provincial income, 
In terms of manufacturing output, between 41 percent and 
74.1 percent of the output which remains in Canada is 
consumed within the province of manufacture. This indi-
cates that, at most, a 59 percent leakage to the rest of 
Canada of manufacturing output occurs, not all of which 
is exported to any one particular province. As the Eco-
nomic Council of Canada notes, "the extent of 'imports' 
into a given region from the rest of the nation or the 
38 
world is much narrower than most people would imagine," 
and "the major reason is that more than half the output 
produced in Canada is in the service sector, and the vast 
majority of services must, by their nature, be provided 
39 
locally." Indeed, as D.A.L. Auld indicates; 
"Clearly, a provincial or regional fiscal 
• policy will be successful if the anti-
recession expenditures are directed to-
wards regional or provincial expenditure. 
Politics and economics dictate that this 
is likely to be the case." -^0 
hence, although import leakages may have an effect 
on the impact of provincially differentiated stabilization 
policy, the magnitude of these leakages in Canada does 
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not suggest that such policy should be abandoned for this 
reason alone. Indeed, the effect of such leakages that 
do exist may be able to be moderated by placement of 
government expenditures in areas where a high local con-
tent is evident. 
A case may then be made for provincially differen-
tiated stabilization policy practiced by either the federal 
government or the provincial governments, or both. It 
appears to be more a matter of conviction rather than of 
empirical evidence that "the use of fiscal policy for sta-
bilization purposes has to be at the national (central) 
41 
level." Furthermore, to a large extent, the theories 
that have been developed in terms of the possibility of 
regional stabilization have been with particular reference 
42 
to the fiscal policy experience in the United States 
where administrative units are notably smaller in geogra-
phic size than in Canada and, therefore, may not exhibit 
particularly unique economic structures. Moreover, the 
case for fiscal centralization even in the United States 
43 
has not been without its critics. Indeed in the Cana-
dian situation, the case for central government control 
of stabilization policy has been largely evidenced by 
what D.A.L. Auld terms the "elegant but simple income 
44 45 
determination model" of Wallace Oates which is par-
tially driven by the critical but not entirely accurate 
assumption that "any increased spending on the part of 
- I1} 
the public or private sector is split between local and 
46 
'foreign' produced goods in the same proportion." On 
the basis of the extent of leakages and the potential for 
public expenditures to be placed in areas of high local 
content, this assumption does not appear to be based in 
reality at least insofar as the public sector is concerned. 
One final economic constraint on the ability of 
the provinces to practice effective independent stabili-
zation policy is the general inability of non-central 
governments to implement monetary policy. This constraint 
in itself implies only that provincial reliance on fiscal 
policy is necessary if the goal of economic stabilization 
is to be achieved at the provincial level and by the pro-
vincial governments, however, since fiscal stabilization 
policy typically requires periodic budgetary deficits in 
recessionary times, such budgetary deficits and the resul-
tant debt of the provincial governments can not be finan-
ced by increases in the money supply and must rather be 
financed by future revenues of the province. As Clarence 
Barber noted: 
"Perhaps the ley factor in determining 
whether a province can pursue an inde-
pendent fiscal policy is the nature of 
the province's borrowing capacity and 
the extent to which it can increase its 
debt." 47 
In this vein, Barber notes that the borrowing capa-
city of a province is generally a function of its credit 
rating in the financial marRet. To the extent that a 
- -n. 
credit rating is a measure of the risk associated with the 
probability of the repayment of debt from one source re-
lative to other sources, the provincial credit rating 
will, of course, depend upon "the willingness and ability 
48 
of the government to service the debt incurred," 
Clearly, the tax base or fiscal capacity of the 
government concerned will have an effect on its ability 
to repay debt. There are, of course, several ways in which 
to determine the tax base of any particular government but 
in general the tax base is determined by governmental 
access to fields of taxation and levels of economic acti-
vity within the jurisdiction. For example, the aggregate 
tax base of a municipality will generally be less than the 
tax base of a nation-state simply because the municipality 
is smaller in size than the nation-state, however, on a 
per capita basis, the fiscal capacity of the municipal 
government may be either greater than or less than that of 
the national government depending upon the relative access 
to the modes of taxation. In the Canadian case, the Bri-
tish North America Act generally outlines this access and 
indicates that the federal government may raise funds 
through any system or mode of taxation whereas the pro-
vincial governments are limited to direct taxation as their 
only source of funds, nence, the federal government is 
generally regarded as having greater fiscal capacity than 
the provincial governments. 
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To the extent that the provincial governments 
do not possess the fiscal capacity to actively stabilize 
the provincial economies, however, it would clearly be 
unrealistic to expect the provinces to attempt to do so. 
f) Provincial Fiscal Capacities: 
Although the isritish ..orth America Act (BNA Act) of 
I667 and its subsequent amendments outline the division 
of powers between the federal and provincial levels of 
government, the responsibility for economic stabilization 
is not explicitly assigned to either level at least partly 
because stabilization was not consisdered a function of 
government at that time. however, the federal government 
was clearly awarded both the greatest fiscal capacity and, 
at that time at least, the greatest fiscal responsibility. 
Indeed, in terms of taxation, Section 91 stipulated that 
the federal government was enpowered with the ability to 
raise monies "by any Mode or System of Taxation" whereas 
the provincial governments were allowed access only to 
the fields of direct taxation and the collection of such 
license fees which came under provincial jurisdiction in 
Section 92. Although presently a lucrative field, direct 
49 
taxation was not politically popular at the time of union 
and the provinces did not enter the personal income tax 
field until 1376 (British Columbia) and tne corporate 
income tax field until 1632 (Quebec). 
Ti, 
In recognition of the fact that direct taxation was poli-
tically unpopular ana in view of the need for the provinces 
to have some revenue base, the federal government undertook 
to provide the provinces v*ith annual per capita uncondit-
ional subsidies generally based on the population of the 
province at Confederation and quite explicitly not sub-
50 
ject to increase over time. Indeed, Section 118 of the 
3AA Act of 1867 noted that such subsidies "shall be in 
full Settlement of all future Demands on Canada." ..his 
•finality clause1 was not, however, fully adhered to and 
such federal-provincial subsidies or equalization payments 
have continually been revised upward from the original 
provisions, even after the provinces entered the direct 
51 
taxation fields. 
The "JKA Act also clearly separates federal and 
provincial powers in terms of legislative competence and 
the provision of public goods. Generally, provincial 
governments are responsible for what were the relatively 
inexpensive fields of education, health and welfare pro-
vision in addition to those subjects pertaining to land 
and natural resource matters as well as property and civil 
rights within the province. The federal government was, 
however, given the responsibility for the relatively more 
expensive provision of national defense, interprovincial 
trade, commerce and transportation as well as the respon-
sibility for currency and banking. 
In addition, the federal government, by Section 91 
-34 
of the .-.ct, was empowered to enact laws for the "Peace, 
Order and ^ood uovernment of Canada" which, in practice, 
is the constitutional authority behinc the War measures 
Act of 1914 and its subsequent a... 'nr!r^ ,,t '
 A. "• 7' ^  ac wc"" 
as for the Public Order temporary measures Act of 1970. 
however, the "Peace, Orcer and uor.d Government" clause has 
not teen interpreted by tne courts as implying general 
supremacy of federal legislation but rather as pertairing 
only to emergency legislation. Nevertheless, Section 92 
establishes as federal jurisdiction "Such Worxs as, al-
though wholly situated witnin tne Frovince are ... de-
clared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the general 
Advantage of iwo or more of the Provinces." 
uenerall-", from tne Confederation debates as well 
as the other provisions of the B.N .A. Act, D..G. ,Creighton 
observed that: 
"It was expected, by both supporters 
and opponents of Confederation, that 
the new provincial legislatures would 
be inferior legislatures, definitely 
Tifferent from the provincial parlia-
ments of the past. It was also gener-
ally believed that in consequerce, tne 
r.cw provircial legislatures should be 
as simple and inexpensive as possible." 52 
In addition to setting a general outline of the 
division of pow- ^s between the provincial and federal 
governments, Confederation also provided for the assump-
tion of all r.rovincial indebteaness by the Dominion govern-
ment fcr which & provincial per capita debt allowance of 
- 3 5T-
approximately ^2 C ^ s allotted. Deot in excess of this 
allottment was also assumed by the Dominion but interest 
at the rate of 5 percent per annum was charged the pro-
vinces on the excess. however, if provincial debt was 
less than ^25 per capita, interest at the rate of y per-
cent per annum was paid by the Dominion to the provinces. 
This debt allowance was scaled up to
 v27.77 per capita in 
1369 and v50. per capita in 18?3 with the entrance of 
53 
Prince Ldward Island into Confederation. 
The assumption of provincial debt coupled with the 
subsidies and debt allowances granted to the provinces by 
the Dominion therefore set precedent for what have become 
known as equalization payments and intergovernmental trans-
fers of funds. The fact that the subsidies as well as 
the debt allowances of the provinces have been revised 
upward from time to time may be taken as an indication 
of the dynamic nature of the financial arrangements of 
Confederation. clnc» «--^;L c-h.i;.tt^c -h. {.;.*» ^ in^nt:?1 3:f»:,;», 
cntr were generally made at the discretion of the Dominion 
government in recognition of the financial needs of the 
provinces, these revisions may be taken as an indication 
of the centralized nature of Canadian federalism. How-
ever, on balance, such revisions in the financial arrange-
ments of Confederation were not unilateral decisions of 
the federal government but rather were a result of pro-
vincial protests and federal-provincial bargaining. In-
deed, 4Hfc R. Bastien notes: 
-^6 
"As early as I869 it (I\ova Scotia) 
threatened to withdraw from the new 
federation and asked leave of the 
critish Parliament to do so on the 
grounds that only by seceding could 
it raise the revenues it needed." 54 
In addition, the maintenance of subsidization of 
provincial revenues even after the provinces entered the 
direct taxation field does not, in itself, lead to the 
conclusion that the federal government effectively dic-
tated the revenues of the provinces. Rather, as D.J. 
McCready indicates; 
"It is in recognition
 0f the dif-
fering capacities of the provinces, 
that the federal and provincial 
governments came to an agreement 
to have equalization grants." 55 
Fell owing Confederation, the dominance of the fede-
ral government in terms of its relative expenditures and 
revenues gradually diminished as the provinces increas-
ingly occupied the personal and corporate income tax fields 
at least partly because of the increased expenditure re-
quirements of education, health care and social welfare 
provision. 
Federal imposition of inccme tax at the corporate 
level and personal level did not occur until the outbreak 
of World War I when the financial requirements of war 
necessitated increased federal revenues. The joint occu-
pancy of the corporate a«d personal income tax fields 
persisted throughout the Depression of the 1930's and 
until 1941 when the provinces agreed to 'rent' their 
-37-
occupancy of these fields to the federal government to 
enable the federal government to once again finance its 
war effort. Joint occupancy of these fields did not, 
however, preclude the provinces from increasing their 
expenditures and by 1939 provincial expenditures had ex-
57 
ceeded federal expenditures. Moreover, the tax rental 
agreements of 1941 provided for federal payments to the 
provinces of at least the amount they had collected from 
53 
these sources m the previous year. 
In 1947, tne tax rental agreements expired '-,„(. a 
modified form was introduced by the federal government 
where the rental payments would be calculated partly on 
the basis of provincial population and the growth rate of 
gross national product. All provinces except Ontario and 
Quebec agreed to these provisions for a five year period. 
In 1952, the agreements were again slightly modified and 
extended for yet another five year period and only ^uebec 
rejected them, presumably "because it considered rental 
agreements contrary to the principle of provincial auto-
59 
nomy." 
The 1957 tax rental agreements generally provided 
for federal payments to the provinces based on a proportion 
of the amount the federal governemnt collected from the 
personal and corporate taxes. In addition, in provinces 
not renting their taxes to the federal government, the 
federal government allowed rebates of up to the amount ^ h-1^ 
oO 
the rental payment would otherwise have been. «\gain, 
"R 
Quebec opted out of the agreements entirely and Ontario 
•rented' only its personal income tax field. 
In I962, tne federal-provincial tax 'rental' 
agreements were replaced by tax 'collection' agreements 
which allowed the provinces to impose taxes on personal 
and corporate income at a rate which was to be determined 
by the provinces themselves. The revenues from these taxes 
would, however, be collected by the federal government and 
returned to the provinces if the provinces accepted the 
federal definition of taxable income and, hence, the fede-
ral tax base. All provinces, with the exception of ^ uebec, 
entered into these agreements although Ontario still re-
tained its own collection of corporate income tax. These 
tax collection agreements returned the provinces to a posi-
tion of full, although not exclusive, occupancy of the cor-
porate and personal income tax fields and removed the res-
ponsibility for the collection of these taxes from those 
provinces which entered into the agreements, Although ad-
ministratively efficient, the collection agreements re-
quired the fiscal responsibility of the provincial govern-
ments as provincial taxes were now easily identifiable 
as such by the electorate. 
However, the I962 arrangements provided for a re-
duction in the rate of taxation Imposed by the federal 
government (tax abatements) in order to allow the provinces 
to impose their own taxes without increasing the overall 
tax burden on the economy. The 'tax room' which was 
ir>« 
vacated by the federal government was rot a maximum iiinit 
to the rate of provincial taxation but rather essentially 
a replacement for the tax rental which otherwise would 
have been paid by the federal government to the provinces. 
Indeed, in lyo2 for example, the feaeral government re-
duced its tax rate on personal income by 16 percentage 
points but Saskatchewan and Manitoba imposed a 22 percent 
tax rate on personal income. By 1967, the federal tax 
abatement had been increased to 23 percent of the basic 
federal tax and the corporate income tax abatement had 
reached 10 percent of corporate taxable income whereas it 
was previously set at 9 percent. As H. Bastien notes; 
"Since 19o7, however, the federal govern-
ment has maintained that if the provinces 
need to Increase their revenues, they 
should do so without, at the same time, 
demanding that the federal government 
reduce its own taxes. This position i$ 
based on the notion that the expenditure 
priorities of the federal government are, 
in principle, as important as those of 
the provinces. It is also based on the 
principle of fiscal responsibility ..." 6l 
Constitutionally then, the federal government pos-
sesses the power to impose both direct and indirect taxes 
whereas the provincial governments are generally limited 
to direct taxation as a means of raising current revenues. 
However, even given the unrestricted although not exclu-
sive access of the provincial governments to the personal 
and corporate income tax fields prior to 1941 and formally 
since 1962, provincial government revenues have not been 
entirely derived from their own sources but are rather 
_ 1 < • » _ , 
supplemented by federal payments of one form or another. 
Primarily, such federal transfers of funds are in recog-
nition of the fact that the provincial economies are char-
acterized by different levels of economic well-being and, 
as such, the per capita yield on various forms of taxation 
62 
is not homogenous across Canada. Although there is cur-
rently no constitutional provision which requires that 
the federal government should equalize the provincial 
per capita revenues, such equalization was at least implied 
by the original financial terms of union into Confederation. 
The federal per capita grants which were allotted to the 
provinces at that time essentially set precedent for future 
years. 
The types of and methods by which equalization 
payments have been made have not, however, been entirely 
consistent over time and have ranged in form from block 
grants to conditional grants and grants in aid. Neverthe-
less, the principle of equalization is firmly entrenched 
in the practice of Canadian fiscal federalism and steps 
have recently been taken to constitutionally entrench this 
principle. As Section 34 of the current Proposed Resolu-
tion for a Joint Address to Her Majesty the yueen respec-
ting the Constitution of Canada (the Constitution Act, 
1931) indicates; 
"Parliament and the government of Canada 
are committed to the principle of sg&king 
equalization payments to ensure that pro-
vincial governments have sufficient reve-
nues to provide reasonably comparable 
-.',-!-
levels of public services at reasonably 
comparable levels of taxation." 
The relative importance of such federal transfer 
payments to the provinces over time is indicated in Figure 
1.3 and in general, these payments were of diminishing 
importance in the 1868 to 1955 period. Since 1955, how-
ever, these payments have represented an increasing pro-
portion of provincial revenues and have been funded by an 
increasing proportion of federal revenues. 
However, these proportions are not consistent ac-
ross all provinces. Generally, the percentage of total 
provincial government revenue derived from such transfers 
tends to be inversely related to the general prosperity of 
the province. In 1979. for example, the Alberta govern-
ment derived only 10.0 percent of its revenues from such 
transfers whereas 4.9.k percent of Newfoundland's revenues 
63 
were in the form of federal transfers. uf course, this 
is not particularly surprising given that the level of 
federal-provincial transfers is, to a large extent, depen-
dent upon the per capita yield of several taxes aw*. LI.IF 
yield does t*»nd to vary with provincial levels of general 
economic well-being. 
g) Summary: 
In summary then, both the federal and the provin-
cial levels of government in Canada have access to policy 
tools which may be utilized for economic stabilization 
—42-
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FIGURE 1.3 
Federal Transfer Payments to the Provincial Governments* 
as a Percentage of Total Provincial and Federal 
Government Current Revenues; Selected Years, 1868-1978 
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purposes. The provincial governments appear to be in a 
relatively weaker position in this regard but this weak-
ness is not insurmountable. The access of provincial 
governments to important fields of taxation indicates 
that their revenues from own sources are variable and, 
as such, they have the ability to deficit finance to the 
extent that they are willing to service the debt which may 
result. 
Moreover, in view of the differing economic con-
ditions which prevail in the provinces in Canada, a strong 
economic case may be made for either provincial stabili-
zation policy or provincially differentiated federal stabi-
lization policy, or both. Furthermore, to the extent that 
both the federal and the provincial governments may prac-
tice stabilization policy or at least enact policy which 
may have a stabilization effect, intergovernmental coordi-
nation of such policy is theoretically required for it to 
have a consistent stabilization effect. 
Given that the federal government fiscal policy 
experience has been less than adequate in terms of econo-
mic stabilization in the postwar period, however, it is 
not entirely clear that fiscal stabilization policy has 
been utilized to achieve the stabilization goal. Indeed, 
it appears likely that, as Gillespie indicates; 
"evaluative studies of the performance 
of contracyclical budgetary policy con-
sistently result in demonstrating that 
stabilization policy failed because 
the goal of stabilization of incomes 
has not been the sole goal, or even 
the most important among several 
goals, or (possibly) even one of the 
goals, which the federal government 
has actively attempted to achieve. 
In other words, the research question 
which has been examined and quantified 
(to varying degrees) may have been the 
wrong one. The research question 
which perhaps should be examined is 
•what factors have caused changes in 
budgetary taxes and expenditures?'. 
A pursuit of the stabilization goal 
would be, at best, one among many in- -^  
fluences on changes in budgetary goals." 
Given that the provincial governments possess at 
least some ability to practice economic stabilization 
policy, this research question should not be restricted 
to federal policy action. Indeed, even if federal fiscal 
policy can be made to be responsive to the economic cli-
mate, there is no guarantee that provincial policy will 
also be responsive to economic conditions and, as such, 
the goal of economic stabilization may not be able to be 
achieved. In other words, if the federal and provincial 
governments respond to different conditions in their res-
pective formulations of fiscal policy, coordination of 
such policy is not likely to be evident and the aggregate 
impact of fiscal policy may not be stabilization. The 
question of what fiscal stabilization policy is responsive 
to, if not the economic climate, should therefore be ad-
dressed at both the federal and provincial levels. Of 
course one possible alternative set of factors which sta-
bilization policy is responsive to is the political climate 
-45 
which prevails. Indeed, as Gillespie hypothesizes, 
"election year budgets may be expansionary independent 
65 
of the economic climate" and "the perverse fiscal policy 
actions of the postwar period may have been successful 
66 
in assuring electoral gains". 
Crx.-r.taR II , 
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a) Introduction: 
From tne preceeding discussion, it may be Hypo-
thesized that federal fiscal policy action is not respcr-
sive to the economic climate and is, presumably, respo?i-
sive to other factors. Moreover, given that the provin-
cial governments at least have the capacity to practice 
fiscal stabilization policy, it may similarly be hypothe-
sized that such policy is not responsive to the ecor. ,Nrric 
climate within the provinces. In addition, to the extent 
that federal and provincial fiscal stabilization policies 
are not responsive to the same factors, federal-provincial 
coordination of such policy is, at best, unlikely. Poli-
tical factors may then be hypothesized as being one pos-
sible set of factors which federal and provincial staoili-
zation policy may be responsive to. however, the poli-
tical climate tends to differ between levels of government 
and across provinces as, for example, election years are 
not identical nor are the parties in power the same acrors 
all provinces. 
This chapter outlines soir.e of t.ie political factors 
which may have a general impact on stabilization policy 
and on federal-provincial coordination of such policy. 
Theoretical hypotheses are then developed with respect to 
the relationship between political factors and economic 
stabilization. 
b) The Political business Cycle: 
The 'political business cycle1 hypothesis as for-
1 
warded by W. Kordhaus generally suggests that incumbent 
politicians will attempt to stimulate the economy prior 
to an election in an effort to make economic conditions 
appear better than they otherwise might have been. The 
implication is that the electorate will vote on the basis 
of the economic record of the incumbent government and 
if economic conditions are improving prior to the election, 
the incumbent will be returned. Although this hypothesis 
tends to suggest that the electorate is somewhat myopic in 
terms of issue perception and that it votes on the basis 
of the immediate situation, it is theoretically interesting 
at least from a stabilization policy perspective, 
however, the operationalization of the political 
business cycle hypothesis has not been particularly ade-
quate insofar as the intent of governments to stimulate 
the economy is concerned. Rather than examining the fiscal 
policy of the incumbent government, Kordhaus simply exa-
mined changes in the unemployment rate immediately prior 
to and following election years. His expection was that 
the unemployment rate would be falling prior to an elec-
tion year and increasing thereafter until the next elec-
tion year. Although his expectations were, by and large, 
supported in the United States in the 1947 to 1972 period, 
with respect to federal elections, in the Canadian case 
support for his expectations did not emerge for the same 
2 
time period and for federal elections. 
Similar studies which focussed on the relation-
ship between the unemployment rate and election years at 
the federal level in the United States have tended to 
3 
yield ambiguous results. Moreover, the operationali-
zation of the political business cycle hypothesis has 
tended to be indirect and concerned with the rate of un-
employment itself rather than actual administrative efforts 
to alter it in election years. Certainly, although the 
unemployment rate may be a factor in determining electoral 
support for incumbent governments, it is not likely to be 
the only factor nor is it possible to assert that simply 
because the unemployment rate was low or falling prior to 
an election that this was necessarily caused by the policy 
action of the government. A more careful analysis of 
actual stabilization policy in election years seems war-
ranted. Indeed, enough electoral support for the reelec-
tion of incumbent governments may be able to be gained 
simply by either claiming and/or demonstrating that the 
government is in fact attempting to better the economic 
conditions. 
With respect to fiscal stabilization policy, it 
is then possible that governments may attempt to stimu-
late the economy through deficit financing during election 
years in order to manipulate the indicators of economic 
performance in a favourable direction. Moreover, it is 
also conceivable that governments may increase expenditures 
on such things as subsidies and capital assistance to the 
private sector during election years in order to be able 
to legitimately claim that it is providing for long term 
economic development or growth. 
In addition to election year stimulation of the 
economy, it is possible that economic stimulation policy 
may be implemented in the year prior to an election given 
that there is a time lag between policy implementation 
and the economic effect of such stimulation. 
Insofar as the political business cycle hypothesis 
is concerned, and given that in Canada, election timing is 
determined largely by the Incumbent government (at least in 
4 
majority government situations), it may be expected that 
economic stimulation will increase as the time to an elec-
tion diminishes and decrease following election years. 
Furthermore, to the extent that electoral success 
may be measured in terms of the proportion of seats or ^K^ 
popular vote for the incumbent government, it is conceiv-
able that economic stimulation will increase in periods of 
- "fV 
low popular support for the incumbent government. Pre-
sumably, such stimulation will lead to a reduction of un-
employment and an increase in growth rates of the economy 
which, in turn, should lead to greater electoral support 
for the incumbent government. Of course, such economic 
stimulation as exists as a result of low popular support 
for the incumbent government may be limitiei to 'swing' 
ridings where the government may be expected to increase 
its proportion of the vote through such 'vote-buying' tac-
tics. So-called 'safe' ridings for the incumbent govern-
ment may not require such stimulation in order to gain 
popular support although such stimulation may theoreti-
cally occur in order to assure that the riding remains 
loyal to the government party. 
The political business cycle hypothesis as for-
warded by Kordhaus and others generally predicts that eco-
nomic policy may be utilized by governments to ensure, or 
at least assist in, the attainment of electoral victory. 
More specifically, this hypothesis implies that governments 
will utilize economic stabilization instruments in an ef-
fort to manipulate indicators of economic conditions in 
a favourable direction at least during election years. 
This further implies that economic stabilization policy 
is not entirely responsive to the economic environment 
and "election year budgets may be expansionary, independent 
5 
of the economic climate." However, the evidence for 
this hypothesis has not been entirely unambiguous. In 
part, this may be the result of the indirect operation-
alization of the hypothesis insofar as actual government 
action is concerned. 
To the extent that the above hypothesis 
holds, however, it also Implies that intergovernmental co-
ordination of stabilization policy is, at best, unlikely. 
Indeed, if stabilization policy is utilized for electoral 
purposes and, as such, is responsive to the political en-
vironment to the extent that differing federal and provin-
cial political conditions exist in the provinces, : :.*v.
 x>^ ' 
response to these political conditions precludes the pos-
sibility of consistent coordination of stabilization policy. 
c) Policy Coordination: 
Although the coordination of federal and provin-
cial budgetary action is desireable from an economic sta-
o 
bilization perspective, it may be hypothesized that such 
coordination does not exist because budgetary action is 
responsive to political conditions rather than the economic 
environment. This hypothesis follows directly from the 
political business cycle hypothesis, however, coordination 
of federal and provincial policy action in Canada may be 
constrained by other factors in addition to those implied 
by the political business cycle hypothesis. 
Such factors as differing ideological positions of 
7 
the federal and provincial governments, differing 
priorities between levels of government and general die-
harmonies between the national and provincial interests 
may inhibit coordination of federal and provincial policy. 
The social, economic and political diversity of the Cana-
dian state which is typically enumerated on a regional or 
provincial basis indicates that national unity may not be 
achieved, or at least has not heen acnieved, if national 
unity is identifiable as nomogeneity. 
Indeed, the concept of national unity may well be 
elusive in the Canadian case as it is widely recognized 
that Canada is not composed of one single nation but rather 
that at least two nations exist. Moreover, according to 
9 
D.V. Smiley, what has been termed the "two nations debate" 
or that the Canadian state is composed of both the Frencn 
and the English nations, has been replaced by "a new ortho-
doxy that Canada is no nation at all but rather is a loose 
10 
union of provinces" or, what .c.h. rsiack terms as tne corn-
11 
pact theory of Canadian federalism. As .H.C. Cairns 
notes; 
"Clearly the political language of feder-
alism and the federal political system, 
with which it is irtertwmed, have encou-
raged a politics in which provincial par-
ticularisms have been accorded special 
prominence. Provincial governments as 
the claimants for, and recipients of fed-
eral bounty, have acted as surrogates 
for the communities they govern. In tne 
dialectical process of federal-provincial 
controversies, the claims of the provin-
cial governments encounter the rival 
claims of the central government with 
its constitutional authority to speak 
for all Canadians ," 12 
-5?-
.o the extent that federal-provincial conflicts 
exist in several areas of policy, R. Preece's obser-
vation that; 
"insofar as there are conflicts between 
groups, the integrative force of each 
group is increased but concomitantly 
the potentially disintegrative force 
is heightened in the society as a 
whole" 13 
may be applicable to federal-provincial relations. More-
over, it may be hypothesized that whatever formal federal 
14 
provincial structural arrangements exist, these arrange-
ments may serve the purpose of being what A. rsreton terms 
15 
as 'blocking* organizations, or at least have not had 
much effect on the coordination of actual policy. The 
federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion, for 
example, which is presumably dedicated to "close coordi-
nated partnership between the federal government and the 
16 
provinces" insofar as the economic development goal is 
concerned, has "come under considerable criticism from 
17 
various quarters" and, "for a considerable period of 
time at least, the intended recipient provinces were the 
13 
most vocal of the critics." 
In general then, the prospects for intergovern-
mental coordination of policy do not seem particularly 
bright. As J. Evenson and R. Simeon note; 
"Under a system of majority rule, in-
evitably the numbers in central Canada 
can defeat the numbers on the peri-
phery, and the numbers of English-Cana-
dians can defeat the French-Canadians. 
So long as political cleavages in 
r * _ 
Canada tend to pit English against 
French, or centre versus peri-
phery, that is a problem impossible 
to reconcile." 19 
In summary, with respect to fiscal economic sta-
bilization policy, it may generally be hypothesized that 
stabilization policy is not consistently responsive to 
the economic climate but rather thai It le "responsive to 
political conditions. Indeed, it may be argued that 
governments utilize the tools of stabilization policy to 
gain re-election. In this way, stimulation of the economy 
may occur regardless of the economic climate. More spe-
cifically, the political business cycle hypothesis implies 
that; 
1) Fiscal stabilization policy is not 
responsive to the economic climate. 
2) Stimulation of the economy will 
occur in election years regardless 
of the economic conditions which 
prevail. 
3) Stimulation of the economy will 
increase as the time to an election 
diminishes. 
4) Stimulation of the economy will 
diminish following election years. 
5) Stimulation of the economy will be 
inversely related to the popular sup-
port for the incumbent government. 
To the extent that economic stabilization is a 
legitimate function of government and that both the fede-
ral and provincial governments in Canada possess at least 
some access to various tools of stabilization policy, the 
above hypotheses may be formulated at both the federal as 
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well as tne provincial levels. In addition, it may be 
hypothesize'4 that the existence of a majority govern-
ment at tne federal level may diminish the propensity of 
the federal government to stimulate tne provincial econo-
mies to the extent that it may feel 'safe' in its ability 
to retain its majority. Moreover, to the extent that the 
incumbent federal or provincial government has success-
fully attained a majority of the popular vote within a 
province, it may feel safe in its ability to attain a 
majority position and, as such, not stimulate the economy 
prior to an election as mucn as it otherwise may have done. 
In addition, the above hypotheses imply that fede-
ral-provincial coordination of fiscal stabilization policy 
may not exist as the federal and provincial governments 
respond to quite different political conditions and not 
at all to the economic conditions within the provinces. 
The politics of Canadian federalism further implies that 
federal-provincial coordination of stabilization policy 
may be unlikely. In this vein, it is possible to hypo-
thesize that; 
6) Federal-provincial coordination of 
fiscal stabilization policy does not 
exist, and 
7) The lack of federal-provincial 
coordination of fiscal stabilization 
policy is partly a result of different 
policy responses to the political cli-
mate as it affects each government and 
partly a result of the politics of 
Canadian federalism itself. 
CtlAP^h III 
hEihODOLOGY 
a) Introductions 
In general, the seven theoretical hypotheses out-
lined in Chapter II were examined for the i960 to 1979 
period utilizing annual data compiled at the provincial 
level. fhis period roughly coincides with the formal 
expiry of federal-provincial tax rental agreements ir 1962 
although, informally, since 1957 the federal government 
allowed tax abatements to provinces wishing to increase 
1 
tax rates on jointly occupied fields of taxation. hence, 
the period under examination is characterized by full pro-
vincial occupancy of the corporate and personal income 
tax fields and, as such, at least the theoretical fiscal 
capacity to practice stabilization policy through the mari-
pulation of both the revenue and expenditure sides of the 
provincial budgets exists at the provincial level. 
Although it is recognized that the provinces do 
differ in terms of fiscal capacity as a result of differing 
Levels of general economic well-being and that differing 
0egress of fiscal autonomy also exist among Trovi. ces as 
a result of differing ir veis ci federal transfer payments, 
these constraints do not appear to be insurmountable 
insofar as the practice of short run stabilization policy 
by the provincial gcvernments is concerned. Gererally, 
the provinces are able to determine tneir owr. rates of 
taxation and hence, to some extent at least, their own 
revenues. 
The hypotheses are examined at both the federal 
and provincial levels with respect to the political and 
economic conditions within the provinces. The primary 
dependent variables are stabilization policy and federal-
provincial coordination of stabilization policy. The in-
dependent variables include the economic and political 
conditions within the provinces. 
b) Operationalization: 
There are several possible operationalizations of 
fiscal stabilization policy. These include nominal and 
interval level measures of budgetary policy direction and 
magnitude as well as more specific measures of programatic 
revenue and expenditures designed to achieve the stabili-
zation goal. Furthermore, more subjectively, tne intent of 
policy makers to achieve the stabilization goal may also be 
understood as a determinant of actual stabilization policy. 
All of the above measures of stabilization wn-" utl-1 L <.->-"* 
tc some extent to ascertain the responsiveness of fiscal 
stabilization policy to economic and political conditions, 
Figure 3T1 
The Relationship Between the Rate of Change in the Consumer Price Index 
and the Gross National Expenditure Implicit Price Index, Canada, 1960-78 
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investment programs are completed may be atie to be al-
2 
tered. As such, both the current and national accounts 
budgetary balances v~i^ utilized as indicators of fis-
cal stabilizat: on policy. 
In terms of the level of the budgetary surplus or 
deficit, however, the existence of inflation makes reli-
able comparison of the nominal dollars figures difficult 
in a time series analysis. AS such, the level of the bud-
getary balances is expressed in constant 1971 dollars. 
The deflation cf post 1V/I and tne inflation of pre 19?1 
levels is on the Das is of the annual percentage change in 
the national Consumer Price Index vail items). ."he per-
centage change in the Consumer trice Index (C?I) is, of 
course, a measure of the rate of change in the general 
price level and it was selected as a measure of inflation 
as a result of its generality, nowever, the CPI is cer-
tainly not the only measure of inflation which is avail-
3 
able, but it is the most publicly conspicuous measure. 
Moreover, in comparison to the percentage change in the 
u-ross i.ational Expenditure (Gi..c) implicit price index, 
which is another general measure of changes in the general 
price level, the differences between tnese two measures do 
not appear to be substantively important. Indeed, Pig-are 
3.1 indicates that the rate of change in the !^,£ implicit 
price index 'explains' approximately 96 percent of tne 
variation of tne percentage change m the CrI, assuming 
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the latter measure to be dependent. Although the slope 
value of the regression equation is significantly less 
than unity at the .05 confidence level (t = 2.71), the 
fact that the two measures are so highly correlated at 
least implies that they are measuring the same phenomenon. 
Furthermore, the national rate of inflation was 
selected as the basis upon which to calculate the constant 
dollar surplus or deficit in order to facilitate inter-
provincial comparisons of budgetary positions. Moreover, 
as indicated in Chapter I, there is no statistically sig-
nificant difference in the rate of inflation among the pro-
vinces, regions, nor between the provinces and the average 
National1 rate for all of Canada. 
National and current accounts basis budgetary 
surplus or deficit positions expressed in constant 1971 
dollars are then utilized as measures of fiscal stabili-
zation policy, however, given the existence of inter-
governmental transfer payments, one may include such pay-
ments as either a federal expenditure or a provincial re-
venue from own sources. This choice depends upon the as-
sumptions one is willing to make concerning th^ir 
discretionary nature. First, if such transfers are en-
tirely conditional on the province spending the funds in 
a certain fashion or on specific programs, then the fede-
ral government is effectively dictating the policies of the 
provinces and such transfers should be considered as 
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federal expenditures. Second, if the transfers are en-
tirely unconditional and determined by consistent struc-
tural arrangements then they should be treated as provin-
cial revenues from own sources. The assumption here is 
that the level of transfers is determined more by the 
extent of the deficiency in the provincial tax base, for 
example, than by unilateral federal political decisions. 
This latter situation appears to be at least partly the 
case in the post i960 period as equalization payments were 
formally institutionalized in 1957. However, transfer 
payments are composed of equalization payments as well as 
of statutory subsidies and conditional grants. 
As is well recognized in the literature on the 
subject, conditional grants impose expenditure constraints 
on the provincial governments to the extent that such 
grants require provincial 'matching funds' which are typi-
5 
cally equal to the original grant. A province accepting 
a conditional grant must therefore allocate at least some 
of its expenditures to programs which are determined by 
the federal government and which may not have otherwise 
been implemented by the province. The problem here is 
twofold. First, the province may refuse the conditional 
grant in which case part of its potential revenues are lost 
entirely. Second, if the province accepts the conditional 
grant, a portion of its own revenues become allocated to 
federally initiated programs. Only Quebec has been 
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generally successful in opting out of conditional grant 
programs in preference for what amounts to a federal block 
or unconditional grant, although all provinces had the op-
tion to do so in the 1965 shared-cost arrangements. Op-
ting out provisions were, however, removed by federal ac-
tion in I969. For a variety of reasons, in 1977 the fede-
ral government itself began the process of withdrawing 
6 
from various shared-cost programs. 
In view of the fact that federal-provincial trans-
fer payments are, in a sense, both a federal expenditure 
as well as a provincial revenue, for the purposes of this 
thesis they will be treated as such. This undoubtedly 
creates problems of multicollinearity between federal and 
provincial policy action but the alternative treatments 
of: (a) ignoring the transfer system entirely; (b) trea-
ting such transfers as federal expenditures only, or; (c) 
treating such transfers as provincial revenues only ignore 
the very real interdependencies of policy action which 
exist between the two levels of government. Indeed, it is 
a federal expenditure decision to offer conditional grants 
in the first place and it is a provincial revenue and ex-
penditure decision to accept them. 
More specific governmental programatic expenditures 
which are at least in theory presumed to be able to have 
an impact on economic growth and employment opportunities 
are also utilized as indicators of stabilization policy 
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action. These expenditures include governmental expendi-
tures on goods and services, subsidies,and capital assis-
tance to the private sector. Again, these variables are 
expressed in terms of their levels in constant 1971 dol-
lars. 
In terms of the economic conditions within the pro-
vinces, given that inflation is a national phenomenon, or 
at least is not variable across provinces, the responsive-
ness of stabilization policy to inflation is not a major 
consideration. However, given the differences in pro-
vincial economic growth and unemployment rates, it is rea-
sonable to expect that economic stabilization policy, if 
it is responsive to economic conditions within the pro-
vinces at all, will be responsive to these conditions. 
Provincial economic growth rates are expressed 
in terms of the growth rates of provincial Gross Domestic 
Product and per capita income, both of which were dis-
counted for inflation at the provincial rate. The selec-
tion of these two measures of real economic growth is in 
view of the fact that economic growth may generally be cal-
culated on the basis of growth in economic output (the 
gross domestic product measure) or in terms of levels of 
economic well-being (the per capita income measure). Al-
though the circular flow notion of economic activity im-
plies that growth in output should be reflected in growth 
in household income, it also tends to assume that "the 
circular flow of income and expenditures is closed" with 
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reference to the particular economy under study. This, 
of course, is not an entirely accurate assumption with 
respect to the provincial economies which not only re-
ceive 'injections' of federal government funds but also 
tend to trade with the other provinces. Moreover, given 
the absence of adequate and reliable data on interpro-
vincial flows of goods and services, as T.K. Rymes points 
out, then; 
"the reliability of estimates that have 
been or could be prepared at the re-
gional level can, at the present stage 
of regional statistical systems, be 
seriously questioned." 8 
The growth rate of provincial Gross Domestic Product 
which is utilized here reflects such an estimate by Sta-
9 
tistics Canada. Nevertheless, the Gross Domestic Product 
measure is theoretically appealing as it is presumably 
responsive to changes in provincial output. The per capi-
ta income measure may, however, be more reliable and fre-
10 
quently referred-to data does exist on this basis. 
In any case, notwithstanding problems in the reli-
ability of the data on provincial economic growth, since 
the data utilized here is generally based on the only data 
available on the subject, it is reasonable to expect that 
if stabilization policy is responsive to economic growth 
at all, it will be reflected by this data. As is indi-
cated in Table 3.1. the growth rate of per capita income 
in the 1961-1979 period was generally highly correlated 
TABLE 3.1 
Regression of Provincial Growth of Per Capita Income With Provincial Rate of 
Growth of Gross Domestic Product (Per Capita Income Dependent) 
Province 
Nfld. 
P.E.I. 
N.S. 
N.B. 
Que. 
Ont. 
Man. 
Sask. 
Alta. 
B.C. 
t - — 
Regression 
Coefficient 
.405 
.780 
1.071 
1.080 
1.184 
1.115 
1.193 
1.188 
.513 
.475 
t-value 
1.74 
3.77 
5.30 
6.21 
7.45 
7.24 
.6.56 
7.07 
4.98 
1.94 
Intercept 
1.657 
2.105 
-1.559 
-1.703 
-2.515 
-3.144 
-3.184 
-3.862 
2.221 
3.H0 
2* 
R 
.113 
.451 
.628 
.702 
.773 
.763 
.723 
.753 
.598 
.147 
F 
3.03 
14.16 
28.02 
38.74 
55.51 
52.44 
42.79 
49.87 
24.83 
3.76 
t for difference 
from 1 
-2.556 
-1.060 
.350 
.462 
1.156 
.745 
1.057 
1.116 
-4.731 
-2.146 
* Adjusted for degrees of freedom (17) 
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with the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product at the pro-
vincial level. Moreover, only in the provinces of New-
foundland, Alberta and British Columbia was the slope 
value of the linear regression of the growth rates of 
provincial per capita income against that of provincial 
Gross Domestic Product significantly different from unity 
11 
at the .05 confidence level. Hence, by and large, these 
two measures of economic growth not only appear to be mea-
suring the same phenomenon, but they also appear to be 
doing so consistently. 
Data on provincial unemployment rates is readily 
12 
available from Statistics Canada in the post 1965 period. 
However, prior to 1966, unemployment rates were reported 
on a regional basis only. Hence, pre 1966 rates were 
estimated by extrapolation of the linear relationship be-
tween provincial and regional unemployment rates in the 
post I965 period as indicated in Table 1.2. 
Data on the political conditions within the pro-
vinces may be classified as either provincial or federal. 
These general conditions and their operational measures 
are as follows: 
a) Election years: expressed in or-
dinal terms (1 for an election year, 
0 otherwise) 
b) Time to an election: expressed in 
terms of number of years to the next 
actual election 
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c) Time since an election: expressed 
in terms of the number of years since 
the last general election 
d) Popular vote for the governing 
party: expressed in terms of the per-
centage of those who voted in the most 
recent general election 
e) Percentage of seats for the gover-
ning party: expressed as the percen-
tage of total seats in the legislature 
(provincial) or parliament (federal) 
available within the province itself 
f) Electoral dominance: expressed in 
ordinal terms calculated on the basis 
of popular vote for the governing 
party at the provincial and federal 
levels within the province (1 for pop-
ular vote over 50 percent, 0 other-
wise) 
g) Federal majority: (ordinal) calculated 
on the basis of seats for the federal 
party in power (1 for over 50 percent 
of the available seats, 0 otherwise) 
at the national level. 
The above measures were generally utilized for both the 
federal and the provincial political conditions within 
the province. For the federal political conditions, of 
course, the governing party is understood as the party 
in power at the federal level, although the popular vote 
and percentage seat measures are calculated within the 
provJ*ic$ itself. 
In terms of federal-provincial coordination of 
fiscal stabilization policy, several measures designed to 
determine the extent to which such policy was mutually re 
inforcing or sterilizing were utilized. Generally, these 
-6*-
were calculated on the basis of the percentage change in 
the levels of constant 1971 dollar budgetary positions and 
programatic expenditure levels compared between the fede-
ral and provincial governments. These measures indicate 
the extent to which an increase in provincial expenditures 
on, for example, capital assistance are associated with a 
similar change in federal expenditures. 
More formally, these measures indicate the pro-
portion of changes in federal budgetary or expenditure 
positions to similar changes at the provincial level. 
Thus, to the extent that the quantity 
jk CHANGE IN FEDERAL EXPENDITURES (OR SURPLUS) 
% CHANGE IN PROVINCIAL EXPENDITURES (OR SURPLUS) 
is greater than zero, federal and provincial policy actions 
are in the same direction In terms of stabilization. This 
measure of coordination of fiscal stabilization policy is, 
however, not without its limitations. First, to the extent 
that the resultant proportion is equal to unity, federal-
provincial stabilization policy, although perfectly coordi-
nated in terms of percentage change in budgetary balances 
or expenditures, is not necessarily either intentionally 
coordinated nor coordinated in terms of levels of such 
expenditures or balances. Second, to the extent that the 
resultant proportion is highly negative in direction, al-
though a lack of coordination can be inferred, this lack 
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of coordination also reflects greater federal than pro-
vincial action insofar as the percentage change in its 
expenditure or budgetary balance is concerned, hence, 
although measures of policy coordination based on this 
proportion tend to indicate the extent to which federal 
and provincial policy is in the same direction, inferences 
based on these measures regarding the extent of coordi-
nation must be made with extreme caution, if at all. 
A more elegant measure of coordination of fiscal 
stabilization policy is then simply the correlation co-
efficient between the size of the federal and the pro-
vincial budgetary balances and expenditure levels. 
An even more simple indicator of coordination of stabi-
lization policy is, of course, the mere coexistence of 
budgetary surplus or deficits at the federal and provin-
cial levels. All of the above measures are utilized to 
some extent. 
The political conditions which may influence the 
extent of intergovernmental coordination of stabilization 
policy are then the conditions which may preclude stabi-
lization policy from being practiced in the first place. 
Moreover, such factors as the existence of federal and 
provincial elections in the same year and the existence 
of differing parties in power at the federal and provin-
cial levels may also have an influence on policy coordi-
nation. This may be partly a result of the differing 
-71-
ideological predispositions of the parties themselves or 
simply the result of the competition between parties for 
14 
electoral success. 
c) Hypotheses: 
Restated, the primary theoretical hypothesis to 
be examined is that JTiscal stabilization policy is not 
responsive to economic conditions but rather that it is 
responsive to political conditions. As a derivative of 
what may be termed the political business cycle hypothe-
sis, this implies that^stabilization policy is utilized 
by incumbent governments to manipulate the economic con-
ditions in a favourable direction in order to attain elec-
toral success. 
On the basis of the political business cycle 
hypothesis, in the Canadian case, it may then be hypo-
thesized that; 
1) Fiscal stabilization policy is not 
responsive to the economic climate. 
2) Stimulation of the economy will 
occur in election years regardless of 
the prevailing economic conditions. 
3) Stimulation of the economy will in-
crease as the time to an election year 
diminishes. 
4) Stimulation of the economy will 
diminish following election years. 
5) Stimulation of the economy will 
be inversely related to the popular 
support for the incumbent government. 
^72-
6) Intergovernmental coordination of 
stabilization policy will not exist 
as a result of differing political 
conditions and possibly as a result 
of the politics of federalism. 
In view of the fact that it may be argued that 
stabilization policy is both possible and desirable at 
the provincial level, these hypotheses were addressed 
at the provincial as well as the federal levels. More-
over, even if stabilization policy is not possible at the 
provincial level, it may be argued that since the pro-
vinces have the fiscal capacity to affect at least gene-
ral levels of economic acitvity in Canada, the coordi-
nation of federal and provincial fiscal policy is re-
quired in order to achieve the goal of economic stabi-
lization. 
The initial analysis of the first five hypotheses 
was facilitated by the examination of the simple corre-
lation coefficients between the stabilization policy res-
ponse variables and the economic and political environ-
mental variables. Following the political business cycle 
hypothesis, it was expected that the stabilization policy 
variables would be highly correlated to the political vari-
ables in the directions indicated in Table 3.2. It was 
also expected that stabilization policy would not be highly 
correlated to the economic variables although Table 3.2 
indicates the direction of correlation which may be expec-
ted if stabilization policy is appropriate insofar as the 
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ecorcmic conditions are concerned. A statistically sig-
nificant correlation of stabilization policy to politi-
cal and ecor.oiric conditions was concluded to exist if the 
probability of a Type One error was .05 or lees on a cre-
tailed test, although tnese hypotneses were tested for all 
provincies and at both tne federal and tne provincial 
levels, no difference between provinces or levels of 
government was expected to exist insofar as tnese general 
measures were concerned. Of course, federal policy res-
ponse was examined in terms of the federal political con-
ditions and provincial policy response was examined in 
terms of the provincial political conditions. 
Ir. addition, multiple stepwise regressions of 
stabilization policy responses to political and economic 
conditions were also utilized to test these hypotheses. 
Although the correlational analysis implies zhe regression 
results, multiple regression was utilized to afford the 
derivation cf general predictive equations concerning tne 
responsiveness of stabilization policy to the various con-
ditions. In vievj of the number of possible independent 
variables however, and the limited degrees of freedom, the 
regression procedure was limited insofar as only statisti-
cally significant or nearly significant variables were en-
tered into the equations. A statistically significant 
regression coefficient was concluded to exist if the pro-
bability that it did not differ from zero was . 0i or less 
on a one-tailed test. Korecver, the only economic vari-
albes included in the regression equations were the real 
growth rates of provincial Gross Tomestic Product and the 
provincial unemployment ra-es. Both of tnese variables 
were lagged by one year in view of what may be termed the 
15 
response lag of fiscal policy. Inflation was omitted 
since inflation does not appear to be a problem which may 
be addressed at tne provincial level. The Gross Domestic 
Product measure of real growth was somewhat arbitrarily 
selected, but its generally high correlation with the 
per capita income measure, as indicated in i'able 3.If 
shows that either measure may have been selected with 
little effect on the results. The possibility that fede-
ral policy is responsive to regional rather than provin-
cial economic conditions is also addressed. 
The hypothesis that federal and provincial iiscal 
stabilization policy is not coordinated was examined in 
a variety of ways. Generally, these include the corre-
lation of federal and provincial stabilization policy 
action as well as tne correlation of the derived measures 
of coordination to economic conditions, to the general 
electoral conditions within the province itself. 
It was expected that federal-provincial coordi-
nation of fiscal stabilization i_.r»** 11 > wn,,' •' ;,«-•;_ t *">..-- ' ? ~'-\... % 
exist and to the extent that it existed at all, it would 
be positively related to the existence of federal and 
provincial elections in the same year as, following the 
political business hypothesis, both levels of government 
will stimulate the economy in election years, however, 
coordination of federal-provincial stabilization policy 
was expected to be negatively related to the existence 
of either federal or provincial elections for the same 
reasons, fiorecver, coordination of policy was not ex-
•jrcte'* t~ *-r' r'-"'-,L'--J t* th^ «H ^ :i^ .' i« . •"nc'i.tl^ .*1-. * r^atl -
tically significant correlation between federal and pro-
vincial stabilization policy was then concluded to exist 
if such correlation significantly differed from zero at 
the .05 level by a one-tailed test. Again, these results 
were not expected to differ substantially across provinces 
except to the extent that the federal and provincial party 
in power is the same. 
In addition, a series of t-tests were also per-
formed in an effort to determine the extent to which fede-
ral-provincial coordination of fiscal policy action is 
dependent upon the existence of the same party in power 
or varies across political parties in power. For these 
tests, the simple coexistence of a budgetary surplus or 
deficit was utilized as the measure of coordination. 
Such comparisons were not, however, made for each pro-
vince but were rather made on the aggregate national 
level primarily as a result of the small number of cases 
available for each province and the lack of variability 
in political parties in power is some provinces (Ontario, 
for example). 
The mean value of coordination was calculated on 
the basis of assigning a value of 1 to coordinated 
policy and 0 otherwise. Although the existence of coordi-
nation on the basis of these measures does not necessarily 
imply the intent to coordinate policy, such intent is 
addressed. Statistically significant differences between 
the mean values of coordination were inferred if the pro-
bability of a Type One error was .05 or less. 
CHAP-TEH IV 
DATA ANALYSIS 
a) Policy Response to Economic or Political Conditions: 
In terms of the level of the provincial govern-
ment budgetary surplus measure of stabilization policy, 
the data in Table 4.1 indicates that such stabilization 
policy has not been particularly responsive to the eco-
nomic conditions at least, insofar as the national ac-
counts balance is concerned. 
This finding is not, however, consistent across 
all provinces. Indeed, not only does budgetary policy 
in Ontario appear to be responsive to real growth and 
unemployment rates, but it is also in the theoretically 
appropriate direction in terms of economic stabilization. 
This implies that fiscal stabilization policy has at least 
been attempted by the Ontario government. 
In all provinces other than Ontario, however, 
fiscal stabilization policy practiced by the provincial 
governments has been, by this measure, either generally 
perverse with respect to the stabilization goal (in New-
foundland and Saskatchewan) or not consistently responsive 
to economic growth and unemployment conditions. Moreover, 
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: . ' \ J * > D ; or c^r i tal •jc,:i--*ir.ce to tne p ' - i v ' c rec tc r v e 
fair ly r.^'-iy co^relv.r . -» the trovmcia^ v.-mrioyipn: 
rates m nctr. ^ / ; ° c ar.c .nr- r*o. .'.ore-over, ..n tne other 
province;*, r^a. expenditures sre "er.era_.iy positively 
c o r r e l a t e .'il tno'V.n not sisrificanti . , ~.c a*: th0 ,C : >ve l , 
to unemployment. Inc tacl^s m i-.-rp '^.ciy I ;r.n<**ate £ ; _ n -
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the provincial etc. omic condlficr.s in several instances. 
1* gcr.~r-l *'. . , '"i*" b*tv " ^  e r r tv:r .c . i l and fede-
ral l e / s l s , ectnofic stcci l i z^ -t Ion ociicv -appears to re 
responsive to *K° ^-oncm c car.:. t i e r v:nhir fre pre vvn^er, 
This rero^nr 1 v~ne_2£ is net , howevcr, cor...i.- "^nt a^rocs rrc — 
vmc.es nor is i t r.ec^csanly appropriate m aircc.t--.on n so-
far as the goal rf economic stab:"I iz'*.*"ion < c cence^.ed. 
Moreover, on ~ne ba;i3 cf :n s la ta , the ^z-c %nc con-
ditions nl^ne co >.-t a*-;e._ir to entirely t :t!?,_»" _ t: * " 1 -
zntion 'pc-i-C/1 :. n -*~;- ~rrvj-ce. 
« • » -
tnere was only limited support for the hypothesis that 
such policy is not responsive to economic conditiers. 
As indicated in Table ^.2, for example, provincial expen-
ditures on capital assistance tc the private recto1" a*-e 
fairly highly correlated to the provincial unemployment 
rates in both Quebec and Ontario, moreover, m tne other 
provinces, such expenditure? are generally positive]y 
correlated \although not significantly so at the ,C5 level) 
to unemployment. The tables in Appendix I indicate a simi-
lar relationship between the provincial expenditure on 
goods and services and the subsidies measures of staoili-
zation policy response with the provincial economic con-
ditions. 
At the federal level, .able U.2 ana the tables m 
Appendix I also indicate that federal programatic expen-
ditures in the provinces are at least parti: rc~>/ - ed to 
the provincial economic conditions in several Instances. 
In general then, at both the provincial and fede-
ral levels, economic stabilization policy appears to be 
responsive to the economic conditions within the provinces. 
This responsiveness is not, however, consistent across pro-
vinces nor is it necessarily appropriate in direction inso-
far as the goal of economic stabilization is concerned, 
Moreover, on the basis of this data, the ecc-'omic con-
ditions alone do not appear to entirely explain rtalili-
zation 'policy1 ir. any province. 
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To 11 c -,_, l r i ioa" '* : me extent of oc^r-In1-: en t e -
tweer tr.~ nat ional acccur**s c.d^etsry oalarc^ r 3 a ? , r e of 
" t c b . 1: ra t ion policy and the K. . .; : cal concttions wit^m 
tne provinces s t cotr. the i~e~r,r<iZ anc provincial > v e , f , 
'iT tr.ougr t o t consis tent across a l l r^ovcr^er, roth feceraj 
arc provincial s tc n i l r a t i or po l ic ies appea*- *• c r& a t leas* 
sorewnat corre la ted to j c l i t i c a l condit ions. 
~,r termr of p^enne al pol icy, tnere- corre la t ions 
tend to oe the s t ronges t am tne most cone i i ter t w_.tr-
r<=.-pect to economic srxmulaticn m times of low to ju l a r 
support for tne governing pa r tv . 'his tprc c *~c confirm ar 
implication of the p o l i t i c a l business ^ycie nypctn^sts. 
r o-.'°ver, the apparent co r r e l a t ion between increasing t i r e 
to an e lect ion y^er a*~i economic stimulation as well as th<= 
re la t ionsh ip oetween increasing time since a» elect ion £-no 
economic contract ion evident ir some provinces is no*- *x-
pl icac le ty the p o l i t i c a l easiness cycle nypcthesiS. .r. 
adc i t ion , although e l ec t i o r y<=>&r prcv i rc ia l cudgels ao 
appear to be expansionary m some prcvi rces , tne fact tnat 
tney are not cons is ten t ly evppnsionary m a l l prcvirces 
may indicate tha t the p o l i t i c a l business cycle nyto*hesis 
is not a p a r t i c u l a r l y good pred ic tor m terms of Dudg&ta*cy 
action at the provincia l l e v e l . 
Indeed, a very s imi l a r set of r e l a t : onsni ts oe-
tween the current account cudgetary measure an- r r c v r c i t l 
p o l i t i c a l conditions W&F founa to e^i^t as mcicated m 
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Appendix II. 
In terms of both the current and national accounts 
measures of budgetary policy direction, feaeral govern-
ment 'responses* to political conditionc are also some-
what inconsistent across provinces, however, ->**"• *"•**>* •-" ' 
correlation between time since an election and economic 
stimulation did emerge at nearly significant levels, 
In terms of programatic erpenditures by the pro-
vincial governments, the political business cycle hypo-
thesis was consistently evidenced in most provinces. In-
deed, although the relationship betweer election years and 
such expenditures was weak, on balance, increased or high 
levels of popular support were associated with diminishing 
levels of economic stimulation. 
At the federal level, however, the relationsnip 
between programatic expenditures and political conditions 
is not entirely clear. In general, decreased stimulation 
is associated witn high levels of support although not 
consistently, moreover, at both the federal and provir-
cial levels, as is indicated in table 4.4 as well as in 
Appendix II, increased expenditures are associated with 
increasing time tc an election as well as diminishing time 
since an election. This, although not specifically pre-
dicted by the political business cycle hypothesis as such, 
may indicate that governments tend to announce programs of 
expenditure in or prior to election years hut to oe carried 
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out fellov?ing the ^lection. >verx neless, there is an 
apparent reiationsnip between political cone t-ions witrin 
the provinces and economic stabilisation policy. 
however, by and large, rhere also exists a rela-
tionship D^ tvreen the economic conditions vthin th*= pro-
vinces and s tabi 1isati or. pel i cy, 
On the basis of these correlation copfficierts 
alone, however, it is imponsitle to f-.:*cer:air the extent 
to which the political con-i*: or.s xa> be more or less im-
portant than economic condition? in explairing stabili-
zation policy, horecver, as tne pel it? oal h ; ir.e*s cycle 
nypothesis indicates, pclitioal and ecov one conditions 
are likely to oe interrelated, ctnerwise, it would clearly 
make little sense for a gov^mcent to attempt to stinulst^ 
tne economy in an effort to gain ^l^ctoral success, 
b) Policy Response to Political ana .-iccnomic Conditions: 
2ne Imerr regression results in Appendix III indi-
cate the provincial staoilization policy responses tc ->oth 
political and eccromic conditions within the prcvirces. 
Generally, in terms of the provincial budgetary surplus or 
deficit measures of stabilizatior policy, such policy was 
consistently found to be perverse in all provinces but 
Ontario and Quebec with respect to the stabilization goal, 
I- orecver, in the majority of orc^s, ^v.cn policy was ex-
pansionary curing election ye'irs. „ine to and since 
-9«, 
election years were not particularly powerful variables 
in terms of explaining budgetary action, however, and 
when they did enter significantly into the equations, 
they tended to enter with greater frequency in 'he ~pj.o-
?**te direction to that, which was originally hypothesized. 
T-V, -1 ' • < Th*1 a + V I A -->•»-.-•>+• i <-*p "! 1 v O ^v-i«? i f - o v t <~ t T*iir» **•• ;>~e 
•which may explain this finding is that although electior 
budgets may be expansionary, they a~e not impltmented 
until the period following the election and, hence, tend 
to have an expansionary effect in the years following the 
election, i-.oreover, new programs and policies announced 
during election campaigns are similarly implimented fol-
lowing the election. To the extent that such programs 
are of a limited life span or their cost may be absorbed 
by post-election increments to the revenues of the govern-
ment concerned, their expansionary effect on the economy 
will diminish over time. Kence as the tim^ t_o the next 
election diminishes, the effect of previous expenditure 
commitments may also decrease and the net effect will be 
relatively contractionary in terms of economic stabili-
zation. 
More programatic expenditures by the provincial 
governments were neither consistently perverse nor consis-
tently appropriate across provinces in ter>'.s of their 
responsiveness to economic conditions. Fairly specific 
t>ro*~ir.cial expenditures on subsidies and OKr-i'.al assistance 
~c9~ 
to the private s-ctorwrre. however, Fengraily positively 
related to the existence of eleclon years wnen elections 
were entered into the -"egress i cr, equaticcs. Ihis -«s not, 
however, the case in Ontario wr.ere a i£ir".-ie in the level 
of s*ach e-:penditures was In faot significantly relatei to 
tne existance of a provincial election. In addition, eo--
nomic stimulation was, by these measures, generally -related 
to a low level or popular support for the government in 
power. ihe r.ata on the relationship of ^nece specific 
measures of provincial government stabilization policy as 
well as the general measure of government current expendi-
tures on goods and services to the time *o and since elec-
tions is not, however, consistent across provinces. In 
Alberta, for example, provincial expenditures on capital 
assistance tend to increase as the time to the next pro-
vincial election diminishes whereas m ^uebec, such ^ x-
pencitures tend to diminish as an election iraws near, 
The regression eo.uations in Appendix IV indicate 
the federal government responsiveness of fiscal stabili-
zation policy withir the province to the political and 
economic conditions which prevail. Insofar as budgetary 
surplus or deficit is concerned, federal budgetary policy 
within the provinces appears to be generally appropriate 
with respect to the economic conditions in Quebec, Ontario, 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan and either unrelated to or per-
verse with respect to the economic conditions in the otoer 
-90-
provi'-ces, i>orecv°r, alth^ugn federal nudgetary surplus 
or deficit does rot, on th° oasis of these rcrres-ion 
eiuacio' - , *• rpear to oe -u nif i cant ly relates * o tne 
existence of electior s ana their tinmg i> all ps-ovxnc--, 
wnen it is related to these v^riaolps, it is usually m 
the direction expected, In^e^c, given the other poli-
tical ana ecoromic concur ions m tr.^  prcvir^e^, such bud-
getary policy is tyoicolly expansionary in all provinces 
except Newfoundland, Ontario, ^uebee and ilberta curing 
election years. Moreover, change- in the level of the 
federal government surplus or deficit on either tne 
national or current accourts ba~is witr.in tne provinces 
appear to be generally expansionary as the time to an elec-
tion decreases and increasingly contractionary m tne 
years follov*mg a federal general election, horeover, 
in the majority of rne provinces, low levels of popular 
support for the federal government terd tu be related to 
economic stimulation. -his is, nowever, partly constrained 
by the weaker relationship between an increasing proportion 
of seats in the province and contractionary policy. Fur-
thermore, a majority government at tne federal level ten.cs 
to be associated generally with economic stimulation of the 
Atlantic provinces, Kanitoba and Saskatchewan, This may 
be the result of tne generally liberal feieral goverrr"Prt 
attempting to attain votes m arras where it nas not done 
particularly well. This, however, also reflects the 
-r l — 
influence of equalization paymerts in tnose provinces, 
in any case, at both the federal and the provin-
cial levels, the regression equations tend to indicate 
at least some fiscal stabilization policy response to 
the political and the economic conditions "which prevail 
in the provinces. r.owever, the responsiveness to eco-
nomic conditions was often perverse in terms of stabili-
zation policy, Stabilization policy responsiveness to 
political conditions generally exists at the federal as 
well as the provincial levels and this responsiveness is 
typically in the directions originally predicted. I\ore-
over, these results are generally consistent across the 
provinces and at both the federal and provincial levels. 
witn seme quallficaiions then, the following con-
clusions may be made with respect to fiscal < tariiization 
at both the federal and prcvircial levels witnin the 
provinces; 
1) Stabilization policy is only partly 
responsive tc economic conditions but 
is, at times, perverse, 
2) During election years, governments 
tend to stimulate the economy. 
3) Stimulation of the economy tends to 
increase as the time since an election 
increases as well as increase as the time 
to an election decreases. 
4) Stimulation, of tne economy rreneraily, 
altnough not consistently, i?creases as the 
popular support for the governing party 
decreases. 
wrt?. 
3! The existence of a majority government 
at tne federal level does not have a clear 
impact on economic stimulation although 
it is associated with economic stimulation 
of some provinces. 
c) Federal-Provincial Policy Coordination: 
Table 4.^ . indicates tne correlation of tne mea-
sures of federal and provincial stabilization policy. 
Depending upon the measure utilized, coordination, on 
this basis, existed eitner very seldimly (in tne case of 
levels of budgetary surplus or deficits) or quite fre-
quently in terms of expenditures or goods and services 
and subsidies, however, the correlation of charges in 
the level of expenditures on goods and services between 
levels of government does not necessarily reflect coordi-
nation of policy action but rather may be indicative of 
generally increasing levels of governmental expenditures 
at both levels of government. The typically positive cor-
relations of subsidies and capital assistance may also 
reflect the generally increasing role of governments in 
the economy,, Insofar as the budgetary measures are con-
cerned, the lack of statistically significant correlation* 
in the majority of the provinces may, however, be taken as 
an indication that, in the Keynsian sense, federal-pro-
vincial coordination of fiscal i-totalization policy does 
not generally exist. This does not imply, nowever, that 
mutually sterilizing budgetary policy is practiced by 
- ' " I -
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conci+icrj within the provinces, 
•s indicated ir Table ' .*, hcweve*'-, w*- en Hggre-
gated to tne rational level, tne e -em of feceral -rro-
vincial ccorcinstion may le e^ -rlai*'e: by a number cf -^ ac-
tors, i-r tne basis cf -re existence c*~ a surolus cr de-
ficit on a national accounts basic, and srruming ccorci-
natior. be cnst v,h?re both levels cf government a-°e m a 
similar budgetary position, in years of both federal a-r* 
provincial elect lens, policy coordination was, by this 
measure, significantly lat the .05 level; greater crar in 
other years. Moreover, on the oa-ic cf the existence of 
increases in real expenditures on roods and services, tne 
existrr-ee of either a feceral or a provincial election 
tends to be associated with a lesser degree of stabili-
zation policy coordination. 
Ir. addition, in times of :t.° same party in pov;er 
at both the federal and the provincial levels, coordination 
of policy in terms of the existence of subsidies and capi-
tal assistance expenditures was greater than in cases 
where differing parties were in power. In terms of the 
proportional measures of coordination, however, t-tests 
for differences in these measures tended to yield few 
statistically significant results0 i.ovicver, these which 
were statistically significant were generally in the came 
direction as the more readily interpret a tie reasv-es of 
the existence of coordination in policy direction. 
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TABLE 4.9 
The Role of Government in the Provincial Economies (Government Current Ex-
penditures as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product) 
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hotes Federal transfer payments to provinces included as federal expenditures 
Source; Data from Statistics Canada, j, r-ovjr ci nl ^eonoTic Accounts: \nerimental 
Data. (Ottawa; Supply and Services, various years) ' 
-101-
Federa!-provincial 'coordination' of fiscal stabi-
lization policy appears to exist insofar as programatic 
expenditures are concerned, however, the relationship 
between increases ir. programatic expenditures at the 
provincial and federal levels may be a result of a general 
trend tovrcrd generally increasing expenditures of govern-
ments. Indeed, such a trend is evidenced by the data in 
Table 4C9, in terms of tne level of federal and provin-
cial budgetary surplus of deficit positions, however, 
intergovernmental coordination of policy was not generally 
evident. Moreover, although such budgetary policy was 
not mutually sterilising in terms of economic stabili-
zation, the extent to which policy coordination was res-
ponsive to the economic conditions within the provinces 
appears to be slight. Phis is, of course, implied by the 
previous finding that the general responsiveness of stabi-
lization policy at the individual federal and provincial 
levels to the provincial economic conditions was similarly 
slight. Intergovernmental coordination of stabilization 
policy was not, however, found to be entirely responsive 
to the political conditions of the existence cf tne same 
party in power at the federal and provincial levels, or 
the existence of federal and/or provincial elections. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AKD COl.'CLUSIOKS 
a) Summary: 
Despite the apparent ability of both the federal and 
provincial levels of government in Canada to practice 
economic stabilization policy in the provinces, as outlined 
in Chapter I, the evidence for the 196l to 1979 period 
suggests that such stabilization policy as was practiced 
was not consistently responsive to the economic conditions 
within the provinces. Rather, economic stabilization 
policy was more responsive to the political electoral 
conditions which prevailed. Such-responsiveness of stabi-
lization policy to electoral conditions may be taken as 
evidence for the so-called political business cycle hypo-
thesis which, in its most general form, predicts that in-
cumbent governments will stimulate the economy in election 
years in an effort to manipulate economic conditions in a 
favourable direction. More specifically, and in the Cana-
dian case, the political business cycle hypothesis was 
seen to imply that; 
1) Fiscal stabilization policy is not 
responsive to the economic climate. 
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2) Stimulation of the economy will 
occur in election years regardless 
of the economic conditions which 
prevail. 
3) Stimulation of the economy will 
increase as the time to an election 
diminishes. 
4) Stimulation of the economy will 
diminish following election years. 
5) Stimulation of the economy will be 
inversely related to the popular sup-
port for the incumbent government. 
6) Federal-provincial coordination of 
fiscal stabilization policy does not 
exist, and 
7) The lack of federal-orovincial 
coordination of fiscal stabilization 
policy is partly a result of different 
policy responses to the political cli-
mate as it affects each government and 
partly a result of the politics of 
Canadian federalism itself. 
These implications of the political business cycle 
were tested in the 1961 to 1979 period for federal and 
provincial policy response to the political and economic 
conditions within the provinces and, in general, it was 
found that; 
1) Stabilization policy is only partly 
responsive to economic conditions but 
is, at times, perverse. 
2) During election years, governments 
tend to stimulate the economy. 
3) Stimulation of the economy tends to 
increase as the time since an election 
increases as well as increase as the time 
to an election decreases. 
4>) Stimulation of the economy generally, 
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although not consistently, increases as the 
popular support for the governing party 
decreases. 
5) The existence of a majority government 
at the federal level does not have a clear 
impact on economic stimulation although 
it is associated with economic stimulation 
of some provinces. 
6) Federal-provincial coordination of 
fiscal budgetary policy does not appear 
to exist consistently across provinces. 
However, coordination of more specific 
programatic expenditures is evident although 
this may be indicative of a generally in-
creasing role of government in the economy 
rather than actual coordination as such. 
7) The extent to which federal-provincial 
coordination of fiscal policy exists does 
not seem to be responsive to the economic 
conditions within the provinces. Rather, it 
is more, although not entirely, responsive 
to the political conditions. 
By and large, these findings were consistent across pro-
vinces and generally applied for the federal as well as 
the provincial levels of government. 
Hence, regardless of whether or not fiscal stabi-
lization policy is possible at the provincial or regional 
level, it does not appear to have been consistently uti-
lized by either the provincial or federal levels of govern-
ment to achieve the stabilization goal. Indeed, although 
the Economic Council of Canada indicated in its 1968 Annual 
Review that there was a potential but limited possibillty 
for regionally differentiated stabilization policy prac-
1 
ticed by the federal government, the general non-respon-
siveness of federal stabilization policy to the economic 
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conditions in the provinces indicates that such policy has 
not been undertaken. Indeed, although the above analysis 
examines the provincial rather than the 'regional1 respon-
siveness of fiscal stabilization policy, the relationship 
between provincial and regional unemployment and growth 
rates outlined in Chapter I indicates that a lack of 
federal responsiveness to the provincial economic con-
ditions will, on aggregation, toe reflected in a lack of 
responsiveness to 'regional' economic conditions. The 
'regional' economy does, after all, include the provincial 
economies. Moreover, as the Economic Council of Canada 
notes ; 
"Regional stabilization measures could 
be implimented in practice in either 
one or both of two ways. The federal 
government could achieve regionally 
differentiated effects simply by 
varying the mix of the policy instru-
ments it already uses. Provincial 
governments could apply their own 
fiscal policies in ways that do not 
differ essentially from those open 
to an Independent nation. In sum, 
the institution of regionalized stabi-
lization policy to reduce regional 
differences in unemployment rates 
would seem both desirable and feas-
ible." 2 
However, despite the indications that the Ontario 
government apparently attempts to direct its fiscal policy 
3 
action to the "full employment budget" and the other pro-
vinces at least have some fiscal capacity to manipulate 
taxes and expenditures, the prospects for provincially 
practiced stabilization policy do not seem particulary 
tOr._ 
bright to the extent that such policy is responsive to 
political rather than economic conditions. 
However, policy responsiveness to political rather 
than economic conditions clearly implies political con-
trol of budgetary policy. Indeed, as G. Bruce Doern 
indicates; 
"While the bureaucracy clearly is 
involved in any policy development, 
especially when it involves tech-
nical and budgetary issues, it seems 
to be at least equally plausible that 
a number of new programs introduced 
in the 1960's are strongly related 
to the major planks of the governing 
political parties." 4 
Although Doern also indicates that; 
"A second hypothesis about the bureau-
cracy is that, with respect to on-
going programs, its role is dominant, 
and in real politcal terms its power 
is superior to the influence of the 
cabinet of the day." 5 
this does not necessarily imply that cabinet does not have 
authority or responsibility in new fields of policy. 
Hence, although the incrementalist hypothesis indicates 
6 
that the bureaucracy is apt to defend existing programs, 
to the extent that new policy initiatives are not funded 
out of a reallocation of existing government expenditures, 
bureaucratic opposition to new initiatives is not likely 
to be substantial. 
Economic stabilization policy may then be able to 
be successfully utilized by incumbent governments for the 
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purposes of electoral gain at least to the extent that such 
policy generally has an expansionary effect not only on the 
levels of economic activity but also on the role of govern-
ment in the economy. The evidence appears to support this 
general conclusion and although, in some provinces, stabili-
zation policy is partly responsive to the economic condi-
tions, it is also largely responsive to electoral condi-
tions. 
By way of summary, tables 5.1 and 5.2 generally 
indicate the responsiveness of federal and provincial fiscal 
stabilization policy to the political and economic condi-
tions within the provinces. Expressed in terms of explained 
2 
variance (addition to R as indicated in Appendix III and IV 
as appropriate), hypothetically 'correct' federal policy 
responses to the political conditions in the provinces 
'explained1, on average, 23.7 and 28.1 percent of policy 
variance in terms of the level of the national accounts 
budgetary balance and the level of capital assistance 
expenditures respectively. Similar results were obtained 
for the other measures of fiscal stabilization policy. 
However, politically 'incorrect1 (in terms of the political 
business cycle hypothesis) policy responses also explain 
some proportion of the federal policy action variance. 
Moreover, on aggregate, economically appropriate policy (in 
terms of the Keynsian macroeconomic framework) at the 
federal level also tends to 'explain' a large proportion of 
the federal policy variance, nevertheless, on balance, 
Table 5.1 
Summary of Statistically Significant Multiple Regression Results by. D£rect;lo*r pf 
Response to Political and Economic Conditions in the Provinces and by Level of 
Government and Province: Level of National Accounts Balance Dependent. 
;- ' • ' ' ' j 
, PROVINCE 
N f i d . 
P . E . I . 
N . S . 
N . B . 
Que. 
O n t . 
Man. 
S a s k . 
A l t a . 
B .C . 
AVERAGE 
( i o t a l / 1 0 
% of Ex-
p l a i n e d 
V a r i a n c e 
rr.DERAL POLICY RESPONSES 
ECONOMIC POLITICAL 
P e r - Approp- C o r r - I n c o r r -
v c r s e r i a t e e c t e c t 
0 0 
.219 0 
0 .127 
. 2 3 1 .016 
0 .332 
0 .507 
0 .655 
.048 .245 
. 0 * * .422 
0 0 
.056 .230 
7 .65 31 .42 
1 
P r o p o r t i o n oi 
.356 . 5 4 1 
.255 .240 
.346 0 
.356 .357 
.232 .273 
0 0 
. 195 .148 
.319 .384 
.127 .055 
.182 0 
.237 .200 
3 2 . 3 5 2 7 . 3 0 
TOTAL 
PROVINCIAL 
ECONOMIC 
P e r - Approp -
v e r s e r i a t e 
V a r i a n c e E x p l a i n e d 
.897 .252 0 
.705 0 .097 
.473 .120 .129 
.062 0 .137 
.837 .062 .175 
.507 .026 . 1 4 1 
.998 0 0 
.996 .505 .016 
. 6 7 1 0 .124 
.182 .153 0 
.732 
100 
.112 .082 
1 8 . 4 8 1 3 . 5 3 
POLICY RESPONSE 
POLITICAL 
C o r r - I n c o r r -
e c t e c t 
. 1 0 1 .350 
.229 . 2 8 1 
0 0 
.440 0 
.050 0 
%t>59 0 
.396 .482 
.267 .039 
.064 .638 
.177 0 
.238 .179 
3 9 . 3 1 29 . 54 
S 
TOTAL 
.704 
.607 
.249 
.576 
.286 
.826 
.854 
.828 
.786 
.329 
.606 
100 
tfote: Aggregate results only. See Appendix III and IV for detail. See table 3.2 for 
summary of "expected" directions. 
Table 5.2 
Summary of Statistically Significant Multiple Regression Results by Direction of 
Response to Political and Economic Conditions in the Provinces and by Level of 
Government and Province: Level of Capital Assistance Expenditutures Dependent. 
PROVINCE 
Nfid. 
P.E.I. 
N.S. 
N.E. 
Que. 
Ont, 
Man. 
Sask. 
Alta. 
B.C. 
AVERAGE 
(total/l(V 
% of Ex-
plained 
Variance 
FEDERAL 
ECONOMIC 1 
Per- Approp-
verse riate 
6 .311 
.203 0 
.150 0 
0 .196 
0 .247 
0 .455 
0 .424 
0 .400 
0 0 
o .252 
.035 .229 
5.19 33.93 
POLICY RESPONSES 
POLITICAL 
Corr- Incorr-
ect ect 
Proportion of V" 
0 .124 
.331 c 
.599 .069 
.398 .193 
.047 .390 
.396 .147 
.573 0 
.307 .234 
0 .098 
,154 .145 
.281 .130 
41.63 19.26 
TOTAL 
arianc< 
.435 
.534 
.818 
.787 
.684 
.999 
.998 
.941 
.098 
.551 
.675 
100 
PROVINCIAL POLICY RESPONSE 
ECONOMIC POLITICAL 
Per- Approp- Corr- Incorr-
verse riate ect ect 
•s Explained 
.150 0 
.457 0 
.:59 0 
0 .048 
0 .443 
.023 .036 
.24] 0 
0 0 
.364 0 
0 0 
.139 .053 
22.10 8.43 
.312 0 
0 .235 
.283 .192 
.647 .208 
.422 .074 
.745 .026 
.013 .497 
0 0 
.554 0 
0 .156 
.289 .134 
45.95 21.30 
S 
TOTAL 
.463 
.692 
.635 
.904 
.946 
.830 
.751 
0 
.917 
.156 
.629 
100 
Note: Aggregate results only. See Appendix III and IV for detail. See Tabl** 3.2 for 
summary of "expected" directions. 
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polltically 'correct1 policy tends to explain the greatest 
proportion of federal fiscal stabilization policy action in 
the provinces. Although there appears to exist a tendency 
for the federal government to practice appropriate (eco-
nomically) stabilization policy in the provinces, such 
policy is certainly not consistently appropriate and is, at 
times, perverse - particularily in the Atlantic provinces. 
Hence, although the federal government does not appear to 
respond, at least somewhat, to the economic conditions in 
the provinces in terms of its fiscal stabilization policy 
action, it also seems to be following the general tenets of 
the political business cycle hypothesis. On average then, 
political and economic conditions within the provinces were 
bound to 'explain' approximately 70 percent of the variance 
of federal stabilization policy action. 
In addition, if federal policy responsiveness to the 
political and economic conditions within the provinces is 
compared by policy type, programatic expenditures tend to be 
far more responsive to political conditions than are budg-
etary balance levels. Indeed, such direct stabilization 
instruments as capital assistance to the private sector are 
highly visible policy actions and may be rather efficient 
instruments in terms of gaining electoral support and, hence, 
re-election of incumbent governments. 
Compared across provinces, federal policy action 
appears to be the most consistently appropriate in terms of 
economic stabilization in Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba. 
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This may reflect the general economic dominance and perhaps 
the economic leadership of the 'core' or central provinces 
in Canada. Indeed, to the extent that interprovincial 
leakages exist, an economically viable core region may 
tend to lead to economically viable peripheral regions 
through the inter-regional trade mechanisms and any 'ripple' 
effects which may be present in an open economy. However, 
hiven that, as indicated in Chapter I, interprovincial 
economic leakages are not of particularly great magnitude in 
Canada, then the perhaps less noble hypothesis that the 
core is where the electorate is and, hence, where govern-
ment policy must be directed, may be forwarded. This 
appears to be evidenced by the political 'correctness' of 
programatic expenditures by the federal government in this 
region although the evidence is less convincing insofar 
as budgetary policy action is concerned. 
Insofar as provincial stabilization policy is 
concerned, there is very little evidence for any hypothesis 
which indicates that the provinces actually pursue rational 
Keynsian stabilization policy either in terms of budgetary 
or programatic expenditure policy. Indeed, where stabilizat-
ion policy is responsive to the economic conditions within 
the provinces at all, on aggregate it is generally perverse. 
In terms of budgetary balances, table 5.1 indicates, fpr 
example, that perversity of budgetary balances generally 
appears to be the rule in Saskatchewan over the period under 
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study. Such perversity insofar as the provincial economic 
conditions are concerned also appears to be rather 
consistent in Newfoundland. Of course, one may hypothesize 
that the smaller or less affluent of the provinces are rel-
atively less able to attract a qualified civil service than 
are the wealthier provinces, however, even in the so-called 
'have1 provinces where a well qualified civil service is 
generally presumed to exist, appropriate budgetary policy 
does not appear to be directed toward the existent economic 
conditions within the province. Indeed, despite assertions 
to the contrary, Ontario and Quebec do not, on the basis of 
the data presented here, appear to be consistently following 
appropriate budgetary policy insofar as the stabilization 
goal is concerned. In addition, in Ontario, politically 
'correct1 budgetary policy 'explains' over 65 percent all 
budgetary policy action on the national accounts basis. 
This may be one factor which has led to the electoral dom-
inance of the Progressive Conservative Party in that province 
in the period under study. The political business cycle 
hypothesis suggests precisely this interpretation. 
Insofar as provincial programatic expenditures are 
concerned, table 5.2 indicates the general perversity of 
capital assistance expenditures in terms of the stabilizat-
ion goal in those provinces where such expenditures have been 
responsive to the economic conditions at all. Quebec 
provides an Interesting contrast to this general finding, 
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however, but such expenditures are also politically 'correct' 
in terms of the political business cycle hypothesis. More-
over, on balance, capital assistance expenditures (as well 
as other programatic expenditures) tend to be highly 'correct' 
in direction in terms of their theoretical ability to ensure 
electoral success. Indeed, in Alberta, for example, such 
expenditures are almost entirely explainable in terms of 
perverse economic policy but 'correct1 political policy. 
Although there is no necessary trade-off between correct 
political policy in terms of policy directed toward re-
election and appropriate econonomic policy in terms of the 
stabilization goal,_the potential and theoretical divergence 
between economic and political action with respect to the 
operational values of the incumbent government could not be 
more clear than in the Alberta example. Manitoba and Prince 
Edward Islandpresent interesting examples of both perverse 
economic policy and incorrect political policy insofar as 
capital assistance expenditures are concerned. In Manitoba's 
case, this may explain the relative instability of the govern-
ments in that province and the frequent apparent realignments 
of the electorate in support of either the Progressive 
Conservative Party or the New Democratic Party in the i960 
to 1979 period under study. In Prince Edward Island, however, 
the Liberal Party has, in general, been dominant in this 
period and this may reflect federal government subsidization 
of the provincial economy rather than provincial government 
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popularity. 
Nevertheless, given that the data presented here 
generally indicates that federal and provincial fiscal 
stabilization policy is only partly responsive to the econ-
omic conditions in the provinces and that, on balance, 
provincial policy is even less consistently responsive to 
economic conditions than is federal policy, the prospects 
for economic stabilization by fiscal means in the provincial 
economies or in Canada generally do not appear to be partic-
ularly promising. This problem is further compounded by the 
apparent responsiveness of both federal and provincial 
stabilization policy to the political conditions within the 
provinces. As such, given the relative automony of the prov-
incial governments in terms of their ability to pursue 
independent policy, perhaps the only viable method by which 
the goal of economic stabilization may be achieved is through 
central (federal) government global (national) monetary policy. 
The limitations of such an approach to economic stabilization 
are, however, severe. 
b) Conclusions: 
At the federal level, the literature on fiscal econ-
omic stabilization policy suggests that such policy has 
failed to achieve the stabilization goal primarily because 
it has not been consistently utilized in response to econ-
omic conditions. The evidence for the 1961 to 1979 period 
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clearly supports this conclusion. Although the major focus 
of this research has been on stabilization policy in the 
provinces, it is reasonable to suppose that if federal 
stabilization policy is not responsive to the economic 
conditions in the provinces, it will not be responsive to 
the national economic conditions. 
Moreover, at the provincial level, although the 
practice of fiscal stabilization policy is partly restricted 
by the fiscal capacities of the provincial governments, 
economic stabilization is possible in the provinces to a 
far greater extent than has generally been aknowledged in 
all but the most recent literature on the subject. However, 
fiscal stabilization policy has not been consistently util-
ized in response to the provincial economic conditions by 
either the federal or the provincial governments in the 
1961 to 1979 period. Moreover, although it may be argued 
that fiscal stabilization policy should be coordinated 
between levels of government in order to be effective, the 
evidence indicates that, on aggregate, fiscal stabilization 
policy has not been entirely coordinated between levels of 
government at least insofar as budgetary policy action is 
concerned. 
At both t^e federal and the provincial levels of 
government, however, although fiscal stabilization policy 
has not been particularly responsive to the economic con-
ditions within the provinces, it has been responsive to 
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the particular political conditions which concern each 
level of government within each province. Primarily, the 
evidence suggests that fiscal stabilization policy has 
been utilized in Canada in an effort to attain or maintain 
electoral success. Although the extent to which such 'vote 
buying' as is suggested by the political business cycle 
hypothesis has been successful was not specifically addressed 
by the hypotheses which were tested in this research, it is 
apparent that fiscal stabilization policy, as a dependent 
variable, is highly responsive to electoral conditions 
within the provinces and is far less responsive to the 
economic conditions. Indeed, fiscal stabilization policy 
is generally expansionary during election years and it is 
also relatively responsive to such electoral conditions as 
time to and since general elections and popular support for 
the party in power. 
To the extent that fiscal stabilization policy is 
responsive to the political rather than the economic 
conditions within the provinces, the prospects for effective 
fiscal stabilization policy do not seem to be particularly 
bright. Moreover, given that federal and provincial 
political conditions are clearly not identical in all 
provinces, the prospects for federal-provincial coordinatiion 
of fiscal economic stabilization policy do not seem promis-
ing. Although numerous reports have enumerated the number 
of federal-provincial agreements on fiscal and economic 
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matters, such agreements as exist clearly do not constitute 
complete coordination of policy action. Moreover, the 
existence of First Minister's Conferences on the economy 
does not seem to have had a particularly positive effect 
insofar as the coordination of fiscal policy is concerned. 
As F.D. Moores, premier of Newfoundland indicated in 1978; 
"We have seen a series of arbitrary 
expenditure cuts on the part of the 
Federal Government. These decisions 
were taken without consultation with 
the provinces, even though most of 
the measures announced directly 
affected the budgets of each province 
with regard to both revenues and 
expenditures." 8 
In conclusion, the indictment of federal and 
provincial fiscal stabilization policy utilization can 
not be that it has been consistently utilized but has 
failed to be effective but rather that it has failed to be 
effective insofar as the stabilization goal is concerned 
because it has not been consistently utilized in response 
to the economic conditions which prevail. Indeed, the 
evidence suggests that federal and provincial fiscal 
stabilization policy is responsive to the political con-
ditions in the provinces and that it is utilized in direct-
ions which will, theoretically, ensure electoral success. 
The political business cycle hypothesis implies this inter-
pretation of the available data and the general consistency 
of this finding across policy types, levels of government, 
and provinces suggests more than a coincidental occurance 
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of such policy utilization. This is not to say, however, 
that fiscal stabilization policy may noy be partly responsive 
to economic conditions insofar as the stabilization goal is 
concerned, but rather that economic stabilization is, at 
best, only one of the policy goals toward which fiscal pol-
icy is directed. Federal fiscal policy appears to be far 
more, although certainly not entirely, responsive to the 
economic conditions in the provinces than does provincial 
policy. Nevertheless, the extent to which such policy is 
responsive to the economic conditions certainly could be, 
in theory at least, improved in all provinces and at both 
levels of government. However, to the extent that economic 
stabilization policy has been effective in ensuring electoral 
success, a shift in the emphasis of such policy from the 
political to the economic conditions which prevail does not 
appear to be a likely voluntary governmental movement. 
Assuming that the goal of economic stabilization is desir-
able from a sociatal perspective, however, the problem is 
how may the stabilization goal be realized given that 
governmental policy is responsive to political rather than 
economic conditions. ' 
One possible means by which the stabilization goal 
may, be attained given that fiscal stabilization policy is 
ineffective is through the practice of appropriate monetary 
policy. However, monetary policy is largely global in its 
approach and, although minor variations in impact may be 
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achieved at the regional or provincial level through the 
practice of central bank moral suasion with respect to 
the regional banks, monetary policy is fundamentally unable 
to be differentiated at the regional or provincial level. 
International and inter-regional mobility of capital dictates 
that much. Moreover, monetary policy which is not reinforced 
by appropriate fiscal policy action is not likely to be 
particularly effective in achieving the stabilization goal. 
In addition, given the propensity for the federal government 
in Canada to be responsive to the political conditions which 
prevail insofar as its fiscal policy action is concerned, 
it seem reasonable to hypothesize that monetary policy is, 
or at least may be, similarly responsive to political rather 
than economic conditions. Of course, future research should 
be undertaken in this regard. Furthermore, it may be fruit-
ful to undertake research into the extent to which provincial 
governments may practice monetary policy indirectly through 
the methods which they select to finance their debt. 
; Of course, future research into the extent to which 
economic stimulation policy has in fact been successful in 
ensuring the electoral success of incymbent governments 
should be undertaken. Such research should take into account 
the predispositions of the electorate to vote for a partic-
ular political party or candidate both on the basis of any 
economic programs announced during the campaign as well as 
on the basis of the economic record of the incumbent. 
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Pre and post election panel data may be particularly 
useful in such a research undertaking. In addition, the 
extent to whichfederal monetary policy and municipal fiscal 
policy is responsive to political and economic conditions 
should be researched in an effort to more completely explore 
the economic or political reasons for the apparent failure 
of stabilization policy in Canada. 
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68.0 
67.1 
79.-+ 
74.9 
93.1 
109.4 
93.1 
92.2 
104.4 
110.1 
100.0 
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APPENDIX I 
V , 
TABLE A-l 
Correlation (Pearsort's R) of Measures of Stabilization Policy to Economic 
Conditions by Level of Government 
1) Level of Current Accounts Surplus (1971 dollars): 
Province 
Nfid. 
P.'?. I. 
K.S. 
2M . 13. 
4ue. 
Ont. 
Man. 
Sask. 
Alta0 
Ji.C. 
In
fl
a-
ti
on
 
Ha
te
 
.379 
.054 
-.514 
.078 
-.434 
-.784 
-.581 
.605 
.833 
.197 
PROVINCIAL 
Un
em
p-
lo
ym
en
t 
Ha
te
 
.578 
-.223 
-.208 
-.138 
-.254 
-.641 
-.261 
.625 
.145 
.337 
Gr
ow
th
 
(P
CI
) 
-.625 
.126 
.207 
.052 
-.240 
.158 
-.047 
-.050 
-.021 
-.1>4 
Gr
ow
th
 
(G
DP
) 
-.146 
-.071 
.492 
.279 
-.073 
.403 
-.203 
-.076 
.230 
-.282 
j 
In
fl
a-
ti
on
 
Ha
te
 
, -.884 
-.514 
-.908 
-.856 
-.866 
-.295 
-.689 
• l!i2 
.893 
.357 
FEDERAI 
Un
em
p-
lo
ym
en
t
 
Ra
te
 
-.406 
-.081 
.138 
-.512 
-.60? 
-.652 
-.554 
-.470 
.238 
-.136 
j 
Gr
ow
tn
 
(?
GI
) 
.173 
-14 V 
.030 
.185 
.003 
. 59? 
.334 
.287 
.314 
.695 
y-. 'x, 
O Q 
U 'J? 
.231 
-.458 
.335 
. 3 "^0 
.40 3 
.334 
.385 
.330 
.647 
.277 
TABLE A-l 
(continued) 
2) Level of Expenditures on Goods and Services (1971 dollars): -
PROVINCIAL I FEDERAL 
P r o v i n c e 
N f i d . 
P . E . I . 
N . S . 
K .B . 
Que. 
On t . 
Man. 
S a s k . 
A l t a . 
B.C. 
In
fl
a-
ti
on
 
Ra
te
 
.77. 
. 488 
.907 
. 8 2 3 
. 8 7 4 
.857 
. 8 5 8 
. 9 4 2 
. 8 9 4 
. 9 2 4 
Un
em
p-
lo
ym
en
i 
Ra
te
 
.12.4 
. 186 
- . 3 0 9 
.207 
. 4 2 4 
.599 
. 438 
.330 
. 3 4 8 
. 4 6 5 
Gr
ow
th
 
(P
CI
) 
- . 0 4 1 
. 4 5 3 
. 128 
.100 
.278 
- . 0 0 6 
.112 
. 0 5 3 
. 0 5 4 
- . 3 6 2 
Gr
ow
th
 
(G
DP
) 
- . 1 5 5 , 
.442 -
- . 2 9 6 , 
- . 2 2 8 -
- . 3 1 2 • 
- . 4 6 8 ' 
.149 • 
- . 0 2 7 ; 
. 254 • 
- . 3 1 0 " 
In
fl
a-
ti
on
 
Ra
te
 
. 8 3 1 
. 5 0 3 
. 8 9 5 
.790 
.789 
. 8 7 3 
. 8 5 1 
.847 
.909 
. 8 5 6 
Un
em
p-
lo
ym
en
 
Ra
te
 
. . 4 4 7 
. 0 7 6 
- . 2 2 2 
. 4 4 3 
. 512 
. 569 
.450 
.4/4-8 
. 3 3 8 
.477 
Gr
ow
th
 
(P
CI
) 
- . 2 6 0 
.440 
.030 
- . 1 7 7 
. 0 3 8 
. 0 7 1 
- . 0 4 4 
- . 0 6 4 
. 0 1 3 
- . 4 2 0 
Gr
ow
th
 
(G
D?
) 
- . 2 6 0 
.420 
- . 3 5 5 
- . 4 4 3 
- . 4 9 0 
- . 3 7 1 
- . 3 9 2 
- . 1 8 ? 
.162 
-.3424. 
TABLE A-l 
(continued) 
3) Level of Expenditures on Subsidies to the Private Sector: 
P r o v i n c e 
N f i d . 
P . E . I . 
M.S. 
N . B . 
Que. 
O n t . 
Man. 
S a s k . 
A l t a . 
B .C. 
PROVINCIAL 
In
fl
a-
ti
on
 
Ra
te
 
. 639 
. 428 
. 8 3 3 
.668 
. 7 4 3 
.907 
. 7 3 1 
. 9 1 5 
. 9 3 1 
. 9 2 3 
Un
em
p*
-
lo
ym
en
t 
Ra
te
 
. 1 5 5 
- . 0 4 3 
- . 1 2 0 
. 108 
.479 
.697 
. 3 2 4 
. 4 7 0 
. 3 1 3 
. 4 2 4 
Gr
ow
th
 
(P
CI
) 
. 0 5 6 
. 3 2 5 
- . 0 1 3 
. 1 8 4 
- . 0 4 2 
- . 2 3 1 
- . 0 0 6 
. 0 6 1 
.119 
- . 2 4 3 
Gr
ow
th
 
(G
DP
) 
- . 2 1 3 
. 2 3 5 
- . 2 4 9 
- . 1 2 8 
- . 3 2 7 
- . 5 9 6 
- . 1 7 5 
- . 0 4 3 
.300 
- . 2 6 3 
In
fl
a-
ti
on
 
Ha
te
 
j .960 
i . 596 
I .870 
> . 9 2 1 
. 926 
1 . 918 
. 7 5 1 
- . 0 5 4 
. 822 
.842 
FEDERAL 
Un
em
p-
lo
ym
en
t
 
Ra
te
 
. 398 
- . 0 9 9 
- . 0 0 3 
.462 
.242 
. 498 
.177 
. 275 
.086 
. 3 0 1 
Gr
ow
th
 
(P
CI
) 
- . 0 1 7 
. 514 
- . 0 5 0 
- . 0 6 8 
.306 
- . 1 9 4 
.030 
_ . ijlf-Q 
. 120 
- . 3 9 0 
Gr
ow
ch
 
(G
DP
) 
- . 1 3 2 
. 6 1 8 
- . 3 8 2 
- . 2 0 3 
- . 1 2 7 
- . 4 2 5 
- . 3 4 2 
. 170 
.557 
- . 3 5 4 
- 1 4 1 -
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TABLE A-2 
C o r r e l a t i o n ( P e a r s * 
1 ) L e v e l 
P r o v i n c e 
N f i d . 
X . c < . 1 . 
N . S . 
N . B . 
^ u e . 
O n t . 
Man. 
o S S K » 
A l t a . 
B . C . 
N f i d . 
P . E . i . 
N . S . 
K . B . 
Q u e . 
O n t . 
Man. 
C59. S K « 
A l t a . 
B . C . 
o n ' s R) o f M e a s u r e s o f S t a b i l i z a t i o n 
C o n d i t i o n s by L e v e l c 
o f C u r r e n t A c c o u n t s S u r p l u s 
a 
o 
•H 
•P 
O U 
o> oj 
H a* ft) >H 
. 2 0 0 
- . 4 4 6 
- . 0 5 5 
.553 
- . 2 0 5 
- . 3 4 9 
. 0 6 6 
. 1 0 9 
- . 0 5 4 
. 0 0 2 
. 0 4 9 
. 1 6 1 
. 1 5 0 
. 1 7 9 
. 0 8 5 
. 0 3 1 
. 1 1 7 
. 1 4 0 
- . 0 5 5 
. 0 1 0 
c 
0 0 ^ 
- P - H CO 
+•» rH 
a) 0 ctj 
a <u <u 
•H H>i 
H a—' 
- . 5 2 6 
. 0 0 0 
- . 2 9 7 
- . 4 2 1 
. 0 8 6 
. 2 2 9 
- . 0 8 8 
- . 1 1 5 
- . 7 9 9 
- . 0 9 5 
- . 3 1 3 
- . 3 3 6 
- . 3 0 2 
- . 3 2 1 
- . 2 2 ? 
- . 0 1 °< 
- . 1 0 8 
. 1 0 4 
. 3 6 2 
. 1 4 9 
*-""»» 
w 
<U 1 r4 
0) O O c ccj 
a c <» 0 tt) 
•H -H rH -H >H 
iH co W +>^— 
( 1 ^ 7 1 _ d c 
h 0 -J>. 
OS CM *—* 
H » >> 
? * ) P + i 
P H - P > rH 
O O O Ctj 
cx, > 0 (U 
PRJ / INCIAL POLICY 
. 1 0 8 
. 5 3 0 
. 2 5 6 
- . 3 5 0 
. 2 4 8 
. 5 1 0 
- . 0 9 3 
- . 0 1 7 
. 1 3 3 
. 2 0 9 
FEDERAL 
- . 2 4 2 
- . 3 1 0 
- . 3 V 1 -
- . 3 v S 
- . 0 2 5 
-.3/7 
- . 4 1 9 
- . 3 0 2 
. 0 9 7 
- . 2 8 9 
- . 4 8 7 
. 3 1 0 
. 3 4 7 
. 0 2 7 
. 2 9 6 
. 7 7 0 
- . 6 0 3 
. 5 8 2 
. 7 2 3 
. 2 8 5 
POLICY 
.473 1 
. 1 4 4 
. 2 0 8 
. 3 1 5 
. 1 8 0 
- . L? l 
. 2 4 2 
. 0 5 0 
- . 0 7 6 
- . 1 2 4 
P o l i c y t o 
»f G o v e r n m e n t 
i l l a r s ) : 
w 
+J 
crj • >> 
0) -P +J 
CO ^ > u 
O O o5 
^.<rH O fX, 
- . 5 4 9 
. 2 9 7 
. 3 5 7 
- . 3 1 4 
. 0 8 3 
. 7 8 1 
- . 4 0 1 
. 6 4 3 
. 1 5 0 
- . 1 9 4 
. 1 6 8 
. 0 3 2 
. 1 2 7 
. 0 ^ 3 
. 0 2 3 
- . 0 35 
. 0 8 9 
. 0 0 0 
- . 1 7 8 
- . 1 4 6 
-P h 
• P (-1 <T 
rH CCj *S 
O ex. 0 
XI On Pn 
t0 P. rH 
•H 3 O C 
a co <« -H 
- . 2 4 3 
n . a . 
. 4 8 4 
. 5 2 5 
. 2 5 3 
n . a . 
- . 1 7 2 
. 4 5 7 
. 4 2 0 
n . a . 
.•549 
. 1 2 9 
. 2 3 3 
. . 2 2 8 
1. .471 
- . 1 9 4 
. 1 6 3 
- . 0 0 6 
. 0 3 5 
n . a . 
P o l i t i c a 
>> r-i 
- P CCJ 
•H r i ^ 
rH » <D > j 
O -P Tj H 
•»-•» > Ct) & 
03 O !L, CJ 
s 0 —-
- . 3 3 0 
- . 3 2 9 
- . 3 5 6 
- . 3 4 6 
- . 2 8 3 
- . 2 0 6 
- . 2 6 3 
- . 1 7 5 
. 2 2 9 
- . 0 9 3 
n . a . : not appl icable 
'• 
2) Leve l 
Province 
N f i d . 
P . E . I . 
N . S . 
N . B . 
Que. 
O n t . 
Man. 
S a s k . 
A l t a . 
B .C . 
N f i d . 
P . E . I . 
N . S . 
N . B . 
Que. 
On t . 
Man. 
S a s k . 
A l t a . 
B .C. 
of E x p e n d i t u r e s on 
c 
o 
•ri 
•p 
o u tt) a5 
H tt) 
W >H 
. 1 2 4 
.187 
- . 3 0 9 
.207 
. 424 
.599 
. 4 3 8 
. 330 
. 3 4 8 
. 4 6 5 
- . 0 5 0 
- . 1 4 5 
- . 1 7 7 
- . 2 4 0 
- . 0 9 5 
- . 2 0 8 
- . 1 5 3 
- . 1 5 5 
- . 1 5 2 
- . 1 9 3 
c 
o o ~ 
-P <H CO 
•P rH 
tt) O Cfl 
a o> <D 
•H H > H 
B W -
TA BLI £ A-2 
( c o n t i n u e d ) 
Goods 
c 
0 
•H 
tt) -P 
tt) O O 
a c a) 
and S e r v l c 
w 
u ccj 
tt) 
d d r l ^ 
H W &q 
PROVINCIAL 
.072 
. 2 3 5 
. 130 
.150 
.198 
- . 0 6 2 
. 1 5 4 
- . 2 - 3 
- . 7 6 0 
. 0 3 1 
. 2 6 0 
. 279 
. 2 8 6 
. 2 9 ? 
. 1 8 1 
. 372 
. 2 3 4 
. 270 
. 2 7 2 
. 277 
-.019 
- . 1 3 6 
. 0 2 1 
.090 
. 0 1 5 
- . 2 3 1 
. 098 
- . 2 4 3 
- . 0 8 5 
. 1 1 3 
•P 
rH 
rH 05 
rH O CX, 
05 <H 
H 
0 0) -P 
P,+J > - ^ 
O O O >? 
f X , > (JJ—• 
POLICY 
FEDERAL 
. 2 9 3 
. 3 2 1 
.399 
. 4 4 5 
.130 
.289 
.349 
. 3 6 1 
.342 
. 4 1 4 
- . 6 6 8 
.347 
- . 7 2 9 
- . 7 2 8 
- . 3 5 2 
- . 7 9 7 
- . 3 1 2 
.119 
.379 
.587 
POLICY 
-.324 
- . 1 3 3 
- . 3 0 0 
- . 3 7 4 
- . 1 3 5 
- . 2 8 1 
- . 4 1 6 
. 0 4 4 
- . 0 5 5 
. 0 8 5 
n . a . : not applicable 
(1971 dol la rs ) : 
-p 
CO > 
•p 0 
<S5 CD S 
tt) J P 
CO rH rH 
O OJ 
?.VH fX, 
- . 600 
.334 
- .580 
- . 769 
.438 
- .796 
- . 364 
.282 
- .190 
.070 
- .222 
- . 054 
- . 206 
- . 1 1 1 
- . 0 1 4 
- . 1 1 1 
- . 243 
.075 
- .088 
.004 
H-> rH 
•P rH CD 
ri Qi ^ 
O CX, O 
.C PH CM 
tO (Xri 
•H 3 O C 
•acj CO V-» -H 
- . 6 9 3 
n . a . 
- . 676 
- . 5 1 3 
- . 3 4 1 
n .a . 
.542 
- . 124 
.031 
n . a . 
- . 374 
- .115 
- .255 
- .259 
.483 
- . 303 
- .268 
- .370 
.113 
n .a . 
S H 
4J a 
•H ri<~^ 
U » tt) >, 
O -P X» H 
T-> > (1) C 
crj O PL, O 
S O - ' 
.344 
.329 
.417 
.399 
.296 
.347 
.305 
.360 
.340 
.407 
3) Level of Expenditures 
P r o v i n c e 
N f i d . 
P . E . I . 
N . S . 
N . B . 
Que. 
On t . 
Man. 
S a s k . 
A l t a . 
B.C. 
N f i d . 
P . E . I . 
N . S . 
N . B . 
Que. 
On t . 
Man. 
S a s k . 
A l t a . 
B.C. 
a 
o 
•H 
•P 
o u 0) 05 
H 0) 
ix) >H 
. . 3 0 0 
. 308 
. 1 8 8 
. 0 9 1 
- . 0 5 0 
. 2 2 4 
. 0 3 1 
. 014 
. 0 5 3 
- . 1 3 0 
- . 0 5 7 
- . 1 1 8 
- . 0 9 0 
- . 0 5 8 
- . 0 6 9 
- . 0 1 9 
- . 1 9 3 
.282 
. 0 1 6 
- . 0 8 5 
c 0 0 ^ 
-P -H CO 
H-> U 
0) 0 ccj 
a a) co 
•H H >H 
EH W w 
- . 3 3 0 
.267 
- . 1 0 1 
- . 0 9 7 
.350 
- . 2 1 0 
. 0 1 5 
- . 0 3 5 
- . 7 9 1 
.207 
.492 
. 455 
.425 
. 376 
. 4 5 4 
. 3 2 1 
. 4 6 3 
- . 1 2 2 
- . 1 0 6 
.317 
n.a.: not applicable 
TABLE A-2 
( c o n t i n u e d ) 
S u b s i d i e s t o the 
c 0 ^ 
•H CO 
tt) -P u CO O O 05 
a c 0) tt) 
•H -H H >H 
EH CO Ctj—• 
-P 
rH 
u a U O PL,
cfl U 
r-i . 
3 0) -P 
p,+j > — . 
0 0 0 - 9 . 
PL, > O - ' 
PROVINCIAL POLICY 
- . 3 2 3 
.348 
- . 0 5 2 
.120 
. 1 0 1 
- . 3 2 9 
. 036 
- . 0 6 6 
. 004 
.129 
FEDERAL 
.115 
.139 
.119 
. 125 
- . 1 1 4 
.057 
.137 
- . 2 1 7 
- . 1 3 0 
. 1 6 3 
- . 5 0 2 
. 3 6 1 
- . 6 0 6 
- . 6 6 4 
- . 5 3 4 
- . 7 8 9 
- . 0 5 1 
.210 
.500 
. 5 8 1 
POLICY 
- . 3 7 9 
- . 0 2 2 
.056 
- . 1 5 8 
. 014 
- . 1 5 9 
- . 1 8 1 
.612 
- . 2 2 6 
.240 
P r i v a t e 
• 
•P 
CO > 
•p 0 
ccj O >> 
tt) - p 
CO rH rH 
O 05 
^<V-1 PL, 
- . 6 9 5 
.209 
- . 4 3 5 
- . 4 0 3 
.042 
- . 8 3 3 
. 049 
. 432 
- . 1 0 6 
. 102 
- . 1 0 9 
.042 
- . 0 3 9 
. 04? 
.156 
- . 0 6 3 
- . 1 7 5 
.612 
- . 1 5 5 
. 1 7 5 
S e c t o r : 
>> 
•P u 
JJ rH tt) 
U o5 S 
O (X, 0 
Si PH CX, 
bQ ft U 
•ri 3 O £ 
B CO <M -H 
-.735 
n . a . 
- . 5 3 ? 
- . 6 1 0 
- . 4 9 9 . 
n . a . 
.635 
. 1 5 5 
. 1 4 6 
n . a . 
- . 4 7 5 
- . 0 8 4 
- . 1 3 7 
- . 1 7 8 
. 5 5 8 
- . 2 4 1 
- . 3 2 3 
. 6 1 6 
. 1 4 5 
n . a . 
>> H 
-P eS 
•H r H -
rH • tt) > 
O P T j r 
•r-3 > 0) t 
05 O li, C 
a 0^ 
. 365 
. 2 8 6 
. 2 1 1 
. 2 4 1 
. 235 
- . 0 1 9 
. 3 6 5 
- . 1 4 6 
. 2 5 5 
. 2 8 4 
- 7 4 < -
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IABLE A-3 
Regression of Indicators of Provincial Stabilization Policy 
with Political and Economic Conditions in the Provinces, 
(Policy Dependent); (Coefficients / F (squared t) / additior 
to ?< } 
Newfoundland: 
1 
1 f 
1 • Unemploy-
ment 
Rate 
Growth 
Rate of 
GDP 
-/o PopU- ' 
lar 
Vote 
1° 
Seats 
Election 
Year 
Time 
Since 
Election 
Time 
to 
Election 
High 
Popular 
Support 
Constant 
R 2
 ' 2 Adj. Rd 
F 
Level of ; 
National I 
Accounts \ 
Surplus 
3.135 j 
4.188 1 
.252 : 
• 
51.619 
2.812 
.202 
27.721 
3.909 
.148 
31.512 
2.026 
.101 
-207.600 
.704 
.605 
7.123 
Level of I Expendi- j 
Current Itures on j 
Accounts 1 Goods andj 
Surplus Services [ 
3. £99 
2.304 
• 334 
-l!285 
2.421 
.075 
! 11.733 
! 2.913 
1 .114 
-8.815 
2.167 
.162 
27.119 
1.618 
.060 
\ 43.409 
.746 
.631 
1 6.459 
1.761 ! 
.053 j 
i 
i 
j 
-iao4 
1.533 
.071 
-58.124 
2.495 
.480 
298.501 
.605 
.514 
60637 
Subsidies[ 
to the j 
Private 
Sector ' 
-.707 [ 
1.319 
.046 
-.442 ! 
1.419 ! 
.032 ; 
1.107 
1.874 
.122 
-^952 
3.747 
.463 
29.942 
.683 
,577 
6.465 
V- ,1 
Capital ! 
Assis- I 
tance Ex- ! 
penditures j 
-.57F ~* 
2.01? 
.150 
-!l87 
2.676 
.236 
-.928 
1.359 
.076 
26.354 
.463 
.339 
3.730 
147-
TABLE A-3 
(continued) 
2) Prince Edward Island: 
T Level of 
National 
Accounts 
Surplus 
Level of 
Current 
Accounts 
Surplus 
Expendi- jSubsidies|Capital 
tures on jto the lAssis-
Goods and|Private 'tance Ex-
Services iSector 'penditures 
j unemploy-
j ment 
Rate 
r — — - — 
1 Growth 
' Hate of 
GDP 
Popu-
1 lar 
I Vote 
•a 
Seats 
Election 
Year 
Time 
Since 
Election 
Time 
to 
Election 
High 
Popular 
Support 
-1.934 
1.983 
.097 
1.044 
2.17? 
.132 
4.433 
3.214 
.281 
-.187 
1.646 
.097 
-1.494 { 
1.304 
.080 
.962 
1.695 
.090 I 
•10.382 
2.544 
.199 
-.248 
1.773 
.112 
.135 
1.844 
.097 
.278 
1.654 
.130 
-.058 
1.261 
.073 
-.477 
1.842 
.135 
.051 
2.17? 
.108 
, p 
•8.847 j 
1543 ! 
.314 j 
2.373 j 
.162 
4.824 
.457 
-.261 
1.358 
.089 
.034 
2.799 
.146 
Constant 
R
 2 
if 
-46.980 ! 
.607 j 
.464 « 
4.241 L__ 
30.363 
.481 
.293 
2.551 
.13.213 
.578 
.425 1 
3.770 
.265 
.692 
.615 
8.984 
- J48-
TABLS A-3 
3) Nova S 
Unemploy-
ment 
Rate 
Growth 
\Rate of 
[GDP 
1;« Popu-
lar 
Vote 
Seats 
• 
Election 
Year 
Time 
Since 
Election 
Time 
to 
Election 
High 
Popular 
Support 
Constant 
R2 
Adj. R2 
F 
cotia: 
Level of 
National 
Accounts 
Surplus 
2.811 
1.493 
.120 
5.247 
2.094 
.129 
(continued) 
Level of 
Current 
Accounts 
Surplus 
3.938 
1.506 
.083 
6.134 
2.396 
.242 
-11.782 
1.991 
.063 
1 
J 
I 
| 
-61.582 
.249 
.141 
2.316 
114.670 
2.447 
.175 
497.352 
-.562 
] .416 
3.847 
Expendi-
tures on 
Goods and 
Services 
-6.687 
1.757 
.088 
-11.333 
2.803 
.045 
-27.825 
3.1H 
.532 
4.7?6 
3.862 
.078 
345.045 ; 
4.500 
.055 
105.124 
5.175 
.026 
83.613 
3.731 
.076 
-19.371 
.300 
.057 
985.143 
.957 
.913 
22.019 
Subsidies 
to the 
Private 
Sector 
-5.030 
2.986 
.363 
1.141 
3.202 
.133 
59.349 
3.149 
.021 
I6.38I 
3.089 
.049 
13.816 
2.721 
.168 
-7.381 
.590 
.034 
125.929 
.773 
.637 
5.681 
Capital 
Assis-
tance Ex- i 
penditures! 
i 
1 
.192 1 
2.617 
.159 
1 
) 
0.073 I 
2.424 S 
.192 j 
.196 
1.217 
.045 
-3.242 
3.372 
.238 
-4.678 
.635 
.513 
5.213 
-149-
TABLE A-3 
(continued) 
4) Kew Brunswick: 
Unemploy-
ment 
Rate 
jGrowth 
Rates of 
GDP 
fa Popu-
lar 
Vote 
fa 
Seats 
Election 
Year 
Time 
Since 
Election 
Time 
to 
Election 
High 
Popular 
Support 
Constant 
R 2
 2 Adj. R2
F 
Level of | 
National 
Accounts 
Surplus 
5 
! 
! 
Level of Expendi-
Current j tures 
Accounts 1 Goods and! 
Surplus | Services 
s 
{ i 
2.676 j 3.054 
I.967 * 1.987 
.137 .096 ' 
s 
1 
4 
1 
15.387 
1.786 
.123 
29.815 
3.000 
.317 
-59.429 
.576 
.461 
4.987 
-2.719 
1.819 
.138 
24.736 
2.633 
.306 
162.367 
.541 
.415 
4.315 
-31.325 
6.371 
.315 
-23.I69 
7.469 
.591 
13.253 
1.512 
.016 
3072.224 
.923 
.902 
43.728 
Subsidies 
to the 
Private 
Sector 
-1.040 
3.200 
.441 
55.352 
.441 
.398 
10.237 
Capital 
Assis-
tance Ex-
penditures 
.318 
3.072 j 
.048 
-4.?43 
14.925 
.223 
-.264 
1.554 
.424 
.900 
4.963 
.033 
17.818 
10.161 
.175 
239.381 
.904 
.849 1 
16.853 
• 
5) Quebec: 
- J ? ( v -
TABLE A-3 
( con t inued) 
! 
i 
i 
i 
I 
Unemploy-
ment 
Rate 
Growth 
Rates of 
GDP 
" ' 
fa Popu-
lar 
Vote 
* 
Seats 
Election 
Year 
Time 
Since 
Election 
Time 
to 
Election 
High 
Popular 
Support 
Constant 
R2 
Adj. R2 
F 
Level of 
National 
Accounts 
Surplus 
-69.732 
2.943 
.175 
-50.416 
3.218 
.062 
18.025 
3.052
 i 
.050 
! 
1 
-287.313 
.286 
.108 
1.608 
Level of 
Current 
Accounts 
Surplus 
-85.585 
5.164 
.081 
-53.616 
4.243 
.182 
22.437 
5.510 
.087 
-148.521 
1.586 
.076 
-98.071 
.427 
1 .236 
2.235 
Expendi-
tures 
Goods and 
Services 
123.969 
8.510 
.118 
-130.813 
10.426 
.512 
44.096 
38.532 
.192 
624.975 
1.569 
.021 
3227.715 
.843 
.791 
16.093 
Subsidies 
to the 
Private 
Sector 
6.653 
5.693 
.286 
-3.031 
11.650 
.285 
-.947 
4.812 
.104 
•51.543 
3.28? 
.039 
11.463 
1.775 
.040 
15.688 
4.341 
.021 
40.563 
.774 
.639 
5.717 
Capital | 
'Assis- 2 
tance Ex- j 
penditures j 
4.532 
12.151 
.427 
-1.026 
1.596 
.016 
-3.813 
15.639 
.105 
-1.085 
41.788 
.294 
20.427 
4.736 
.014 
6.358 
4.136 
.009 
6.942 
7.549 
.016 
31.592 
9.301 
.058 
65.097 
.946 
.892 
17.55. ! 
-151-
TABLE A-3 
(continued) 
6) Ontario: 
1 
Unemploy-
ment 
Rate 
Growth 
Rates of 
GDP 
fa Popu-
lar 
Vote 
fa 
Seats 
Election 
Year 
Time 
Since 
Election 
Time 
to 
Election 
High , 
Popular 
Support 
Constant , 
R 2 
Adj. R 2 
F 
, — > 
Level of 
National 
Accounts 
Surplus 
-127.914 
14.771 
.141 
-25.876 
1.813 
.026 
60.402 
17.017 
.571 
-233.789 
4.585 
.087 
-2029.175 
.826 
.768 
14.268 
Level of j Expendi-
Current j tures 
Accounts I Goods and 
Surplus •Services 
-134.495 
30.158 
.173 
-33.309 
4.524 
.038 
2^.370 
31.257 
.610 
-194.351 
5.449 
.076 
-574.594 
.898 
.865 
26.520 
185.908 
6.975 
.121 
-131.655 
22.870 
.635 
6265.133 
.757 
.722 
21.742 
f •" • — 1 
Subsidies 
to the 
Private 
Sector 
19.324 
290.808 
.209 
3.651 
21.661 
.007 
8.385 
34.280 
.014 
-5.580 
107.477 
.694 
-65.982 
16.059 
.009 
-13.615 
10.039 
.010 
-26.472 
38.806 
.048 
-20.949 
.991 
.985 
148.959 
Capital 
Assis-
tance Ex-
penditures 
2.787 
3.114 
.036 
1.866 
4.032 
.023 : 
-2.656 
15.311 
.646 
• 
1 
-57.736 
6.569 ! 
.004 
-15.854 
6.870 
.022 
-14.983 
6.599 
,099 
165.713 
.830 
.727 
8.113 
- 1 5 2 -
7) Manitoba: 
TABLE A-3 
(con t inued) 
Unemploy-
ment 
Rate 
Growth 
Rate of 
GDP 
fa Popu-
l a r 
Vote 
Sea t s 
Election 
Year 
1 Time 
j Since 
Election 
J High 
] Popular 
Support 
i-
Level of 
Katinal 
Accounts 
Surplus 
Time 
to 
j Election 
i Constant 
I Adj. R2 
\ F 
-34.815 
49.44? 
.317 
17. 
35. 
-26. 
3. 
-7. 
1. 
» 
Level of jExpendi-
Current 
Accounts 
Surplus 
tures 
Subsidies 
to the 
i Goods and ', Private 
486 
850 
343 
692 
626 
029 
637 
631 
023 
-41.447 
12.296 
.165 
443.232 
.*54 
.801 
12.297 
2.022 
20.417 
.014 
-51.766 
998.472 
.363 
26.352 
760.231 
.388 
-15.117 
29.605 
.011 
iServices 
J—— 
\ 39.910 
11.216 
.202 
11.833 
3.941 
.053 
-53.080 
218.040 
.217 
720.092 
.994 
.990 
287.326 
-12.712 
14.351 
.184 
29.154 
2.956 
.066 
203.280 
14.059 
^293^ 
601.963 
.800 
.687 
7.150 
jSector 
.404 
Capital 
Assis-
tance Ex-
pend iutres 
-.215 
9.664 
.241 
.659 
28.704 
.480 
-.369 
29.233 
.013 
1.031 
14.681 
.017 
-153-
TABLE A-3 
( con t inued) 
8) Saskatchewan: 
1 
} 
j Unemploy-
; ment 
1 Rate 
t 
\ Growth 
;. Rate of 
j GDP 
fa Popu-
lar 
Vote 
fa 
Seats 
Election 
Year 
Time 
Since 
Election 
Time 
to 
Election 
High 
Popular 
Support 
Constant 
H
 2 Adj. R2
F 
Level of 
National 
Accounts 
Surplus 
29.315 
25.215 
.505 
1.025 
2.534 
.016 
7.378 
IO.362 
.206 
-110.557 
2.948 
.057 
-26.133 
2.044 
.004 
-29.293 
3.157 
.004 
-56.949i 
3.322J 
.035 
-279.778 
.828 
.694 
6.1?2 
Level of 
Current 
Accounts 
Surplus 
16.753 
2.507 
.132 
10.083 
15.363 
.079 
3.705 
3.227 
.413 
-193.554 
5.723 
.036 
-45.182 
4.285 
.025 
-59.618 
7.105 
.082 
-110.245 
7.195 
.061 
-452.517 
.828 
.695 
6.20Q 
Expendi-
tures 
Goods and 
Services 
24.329 
1.835 
.109 
• 
• 
• 
; 
1 
102.765 
.109 
.049 
1.835' 
Subsidies Capital 
to the jAssis-
Private jtance Ex- . 
Sector 1penditures 1 
! 
11.745 
4.248 
.221 
-13.123 
.221 
.169 
4.248 
j 
! 
( 
3 
i 
1 
i 
i 
t % 
i 
I 
I t 
t 
t 
1 
i 
i 
_ 
-154 -
9) A l b e r t a : 
TABIfi A-3 
( con t inued) 
[Level of 
National I Current 
!Level of 
Unemploy-
ment 
Rate 
Growth 
Rate of 
GDP 
fa Popu-
l a r 
Vote 
Accounts 
Surplus 
Accounts 
Surp lus 
30.369 
13.246 
.124 
34.672 
16.633 
.149 
fa 
Sea t s 
— f 
E l e c t i o n 1 
Year i 
~t 
•244.606 \-247.89? 
4.749 ( 4 .699 
.064 .; .056 
Time 
Since 
E l e c t i o n 
Time 
t o 
E l e c t i o n 
High 
Popular 
Support 
' -
Cons t a n t 
R2 
Adj . R2 
F 
10.824 
56.736 
.638 
3 -11 .733 j 64.147 
1 .639 
1 
•206.724 
.826 
.786 
20.540 
-172 .976 
. .844 
.808 
23.455 
jExpendi-
I t u r e s 
[Goods and 
1Services 
H~ 
13.514 
24.050 
.153 
-7 .919 
l 28.040 
! .187 
-6 .050 
129.650 
.577 
"TZ Subsidies Capital 
to the 
Private 
Sector 
857.250 
.917 
.898 
48.125 
3.720 
104.522 
.208 
-1.366 
55.667 
.117 
-I6.392 
11.218 
.023 
-1.327 
411.944 
.626 
tance Ex-
penditures 
114.223 
.975 
.966 
114.761 
.903 
59.851 
.364 
-.239 
101.722 
.535 
-2.608 
2.910 
.019 
-2.985 
.91? 
.898 
47.955 
-155-
TA3LS A-3 
(continued) 
10) British Columbia: 
Growth 
Rate of 
GDP 
fa Pop-a-
l a r 
Vote 
fa 
S e a t s 
Election 
Year \ 
Level of 
National 
Accounts 
Surplus 
19.614 
3.H3 
.153 
Level of 
Current 
Accounts 
Surplus 
10.710 I 
2.857 
.091 I 
Time 
S ince 
E l e c t i o n \ 
I 
35.219 
1.672 
.086 
Time 
t o 
E l e c t i o n 
High 
Popular 
Support 
^ • v m * * ^ * * - " 
24.387 
3.662 
.114 
12.658 
3.042 
.158 
! Constant 
R 2
 2 
A d j . R 2 
F 
-543.997 
.329 
.175 
2.133J 
Expendi-
tures 
Goods and 
Services 
Subsidies 
to the 
Private 
Sector 
112.189 > 15.122 
320.436 : 241.493 
.436 • .378 
28.315 
44.628 
.133 
77.200 
377.334 
.345 
19.. 904 
35.724 
.065 
117.711 L5227.I8I 
.272 .978 
.168 .971 
2.613 j 135.017 
4.480 
46.391 
.156 
10.622 
296.136 
.337 
2.743 
28.060 
.073 
14.466 
3.704 
.008 
13.305 
11.929 
.026 
Capital 
Assis-
tance Ex-
penditures 
-738.007 
.973 
.965 
?4.236 
.586 
2.779 
.156 
•31.714 
.156 j 
.100 I 
2.779 1 
- 1 5 6 -
APPENDIX IV 
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TABLE A-4 
Regression of Indicators of Feieral Stabilisation Policy 
with Political and Econozic Conditlors ir. the Provinces, 
(Policy Dependent); (Coefficients / F (squared t) / addition 
t o R*) 
1) I\ ewf ound land 
pLevel""of" 
' N a t i o n a l 
A c c o u n t s 
S u r p l u s 
Unemploy-
ment 
R a t e 
I 111 _
 L l| HIWWl I I I W II ' 
Growth 
' Rate of 
GDP 
] Time 
Since f 
'.Election j 
* Time 
jto 
'Election 
jhigh 
jPopular 
-•Support 
jMajority 
•Govern-
iment 
30.895 
20.800 
• 0?4 
•11.917 
70.925 
.434 
205.780 
2.183 
.282 
Level of 
Current 
Accounts 
Surplus 
! 
30.400 
.9.053 
.0?2 
-11.661 
64.256 
.413 
230.516 
2.121 
.302 
1 
-197o794 j -195,721 
12.534] 11.612 
.107 j .105 
Expendi-
tures on 
•uoois and1 
(Services 
I Constant 1-1182.7-^6 -1162.728 
IR2 ~ i .89? \ .891 
!Adj, 
F 
.1.. 
.603] 
2c.249 j .855 24.618 
~..~~t. 
S u b s i d i e s 
t o t h e 
P r i v a t e 
S e c t o r 
- 2 . 5 6 7 
4 . 9 5 1 
.078 j 
1 . 5 . 2 j 
27 .96? ! 
.367 } 
j 11 .304 
1 4 . 6 3 4 
1 .242 
-85.067 ? - 2 4 . 7 1 6 
12 .456 { 3 .004 
.348 1 .112 
1 ^ . 2 7 8 
.794 
.7^7 
16 , ?09 
i 
! - 1 0 . 9 1 1 
; ,514 
.^+02 
. 4 . - 8 4 
C a p i t a l 
l A s s i s -
! t a n c e E x -
p e n d i t u r e s ' 
3.394 
3.321 
.160 
.464 
5.673 
.311 
- . i l l 
3.079 
.124 
3 .534 
.435 
.355 
5 .393 
-1 5«-
2) 
TABLE A-4 
(continued) 
Prince Edward Island: 
: Unemploy-
ment 
Rate 
i, . „ 
j Growth 
' Rate of 
| GDP 
j 
, fa Popu-
\ lar 
i Vote 
; Seats \ 
Election 
Year 
j Time 
f Since 
j Election 
! Time 
I to 
\ Section 
\ High 
\ Popular 
\ Support 
| Majority | Govern-
ment 
Constant 
R 
Adj. R 
F 
Level of 
Kati onal 
Accounts 
.15.606 
2.863 
.160 
Level of 
Current 
Accounts 
Surplus 
- 5 . 9 2 5 1 
1 0 . 9 1 3 i 
. 219 • 
1 0 . 0 7 8 \ 
1 0 . 6 5 5 \ 
.095 j 
* 
- 1 . 2 4 7 j 
6 . 9 2 9 i 
. O Q Q « 
- 5 6 . 1 7 8 
4 . 7 8 3 
. 1 4 1 
474.70O 
. 7 0 5 
.557 
4 , 7 7 = , 
- 6 . I 6 I 
1 2 . 1 9 0 
. 210 
1 1 . 0 2 9 
1 3 . 1 9 1 
. 0 9 0 
- 1 . 4 0 3 
9 . 0 7 0 
. 1 1 5 
•15 .712 
2 . 4 6 6 
. 1 5 ? 
- 6 3 . 2 1 1 
6 .259 
. 1 6 5 
1-J 
• 5 0 s . 9 6 3 
. 7 3 6 
. 6 0 5 
Expend ! - ; S u b s i d i e s C a p i t a l 
tures on j to the 
Goods and 
Services 
1.147 
7 .5^8 
. 176 
•1 .963 
7 . 4 6 5 
. 0 8 1 
. 2 4 3 
4 . 8 4 3 
. 0 8 1 
3 .150 
2 .129 
.160 
Private 
Sector 
II.435 f 
3.658 I 
IO6.033 ( 
.633 | 
.449 ! 
3.447 \ 
[P-ssls-
; tance Ex-
!penditures 
. 984 j 
8 .711 1 
.382 1 
- . 1 1 0 ] 
5,342 j 
. 0 2 1 j 
.162 j 
4 . 6 2 0 ! 
.112 | 
! 
16 .658 I 
4 . 2 5 4 
.015 
' I 
5.339 1 
5 .616 j 
.069 j 
7.614 j 
1 0 . 7 5 3 i 
. 184 j 
31 .463 
. 7 8 3 
.638 
.234 
3.992 
. 203 
.135 
3.4?5 I 
3.487 
2 . 2 2 1 { 
9 .647 j 
. 196 l 
-A 
-2 784 1 
.534 j 
.416 } 
L ^RR I 
-159-
TABLE A-4 
(continued) 
3) Kova Scotia; 
Level of 
National 
Level of 
Current 
Accounts• Accounts 
\ Surplus 
Unemploy-I 
ment 
Rate 
! Surplus j burj 
;Growth 
'• Rate of 
GDP 
Sfa Popu-
i lar 
j Vote 
i 
fa 
Seats 
Election 
Year 
64.720 
7.040 
.127 
25.025 
6.849 
.263 
Time 
Since . 
Election \ 
— 1 
•58.458 
2.054 i 
.083 I 
Time ' 
to 
Election ! 
High 1 
Popular ] 
Support I 
Majority \ 
Govern- ! 
ment 
64.511 
7.819 
.148 
23.898 
7.071 
.257 
Expendi- ;Subsidies Capital 
tures on
 ;to the ,Assis-
Goods and'Private ;tance Ex-
Services 'Sector 'penditures 
-59 
2 
• 541 
.412 ! 
.093 j 
•17.923 \ 
4.352 j 
.163 
.192.829 
7.093 
.1?4 
103.168 
6.046 j 
.174 i 
200.372 
9.923 
.124 
54.733 
6.701 
.115 
75.893 
13.704 
.181 
-71.216 
3.612 
.134 
-2.509 
21.895 
.150 
-2.509 
21.200 
.503 
.200 
4.564 
.069 
2.803 
9.409 
.096 
I 
f 
102.044 I 
.818 I 
.758 ( 
13.554 I 
—~4 
430.758 -128.537 
.554 
.406 
3.729 
-1*0-
TABLE A-4 
(continued) 
4) New Brunswick: 
Unemploy-! 
ment j 
Rate < 
Growth ; 
Rate of { 
GDP j 
, 4 
I fa Popu-
lar 
Vote 
J fa 
\ Seats 
1 Election 
Year 
Time 
t Since 
Election 
Time 
Level of 
National 
Accounts 
Surplus 
66.72? 
16.893 
.231 
15.309 
3.913 
.016 
-72.692 
42.680 
.041 
19.682 
26.059 
.133 
l to 
l Election ) 
' High 
Popular 
Support ' 
Majority : 
Govern-
ment 
Level of 
Current 
Accounts 
Surplus 
-72.372 
208.366 
.262 ; 
i 
-24.477 ' 
26.427 S 
.074 j 
79.468 j 
203.728 ! 
.167 j 
-19.256 
69.991 
.254 
-45.109 
2.167 , 
.005 
24.390 -39.349 
2.889 8.967 
.02? I .016 
-340.931? 
16.892 
.316 
198.849j -209.183 
18.255j 56.889 
.196! .201 
expendi-
tures on 
Goods and 
Services 
8.624 
15.497 
.153 
I Constant ' 1870.9331-2061.783 
R2 i . 962 ! .979 
Adj . R2 .9331 .963 
32.595 61.583 
- 1 5 . 8 2 1 
29.396 
.344 
3.793 
9.375 
.134 
16.382 
12.421 
.198 
585.041 
.829 
.772 
1 4 = ^ 5 
Subsidies Capital 
to the Assis-
Private tance Ex-
Sector 
13.711 
18.916 
.213 
J 38.503 
I 14.137 
! .19? 
1 
4-
240.333 
.769 
.664 
7.328 
penditi*res 
-14.095 
10.654 
.070 
4.956 • 
7.299 : 
.153 ': 
59.397 1 
5.767 ; 
.136 \ 
1.327 
20.946 
.196 
-2.014 
15.702 
.244 
.826 
24.598 
..149 
-7.231 
3.751 
.154 
3.658 
6.363 
.044 
44,364 i 
• 7&7 ; 
.764 ' 
11.346 ; 
-1*1-
TA3LE A-4 
(continued) 
5) Quebec: 
jLevel of 
] National 
jAccounts 
Surplus 
Unemploy-
ment 
Rate 
Growth 
Rate of 
GDP 
fa Popu-
lar 
Vote 
-283 .556 
8.042 
.332 
Level of 
Cur ren t 
Accounts 
Surplus 
-r 
-224.540 
7.008 
.369 
36.672 
2 .626 ! 
. 0 ? 8 j 
Expendi-
tures on 
Goods and 
Services 
fa 
Seats 
Election | 
Year 
Time 
Since 
Election 
Time 
to 
Election 
-202.743 
9.463 
.133 
-211.067 
2.025 
.037 
. High 1-1647.926 
* Popular I 15.978 
Support I .236 
157.654 
13.938 
.033 
-55.257 
11.378 
.059 
Majority 
Govern-
ment 
769.443 
2.369 
.021 
-181.511 
8.241 
.130 
t 
1 
i 
i 
-1288.633! 
12.968 
.235 
38.989 
2.747 
.263 
Subsidies 
to the 
Private 
Sector 
-34.806 
12.337 
.037 
11.861 
9.520 
.192 
47.046 
10.047 
.043 
284.048 
15.853 
.244 
•30.689 
7.504 
.107 
8.108 
3.111 
.094 
97.161 
4.978 
.126 
331.887 
111.404 
.311 
Capital 
Assis-
tance Ex-
penditures 
6.921 
2.912 
.247 
-3 .685 
5.567 
.047 
1.150 
3.986 
.115 
-20.945 
2.398 
.022 
41.796 
8.349 
.253 
Cons tant 
R2 
Adj . R2 
P 
1063o443 
.837 
.728 
7.700 
I 
.1270.631 
.826 
c747i 
I n Ji Cr\ \ 
1198.868 
.779 
.679 
7.735 
929.096 
.638 
.517 
5.280 
85.277 
.684 
.540 
4.760 
-1*2-
TABLE A-4 
(continued) 
6) Ontario: 
Unemploy-
ment 
Rate 
! Level of ' Level of 
;National | Current | Accounts • Accounts 
I Surplus j Surplus 
-232.519 1 -237.854 
6.231 ! 62.087 
.432 ; .425 
Expendi- j Subsidies;Capital 
tures on 
Goods and 
Services 
r Growth 
Rate of 
GDP 
.Vtmtr*a**x"& 
Seats 
Election 
Year 
Time 
Since 
Election 
Time 
to 
: Election 
High 
Popular 
Support 
-4 |Majority ! 
Govern-
ment 
68.562 
2.113 
.075 
72.046 
2.148 
.077 
Constant 
R
 2 
Adj. R* 
11811.938 
.507 
.436 
7.191 
372.118 
123.311 
.324 
77.952 
20.790 
.065 
to the 
Private 
Sector 
1909.588 
.502 
.431 
7.046 
45.676 
14.029 
.248 
* 
125 .034! 
9.6205 
.173? 
* 
•1715.300 I 
101.476[ 
.330'! 
1 
360.944 j 
11.833? 
.056J 
Assis-
tance Ex-
penditures 
13.051 
5002.715 
.455 
.155 
19.266 
.002 
29.789 j 
4.196 | 
.128 j 
-178.382 I-59.633 
8.402 53622.079 
.22? { .396 
t 
j 15.376 
; 517.429 
I .145 
•253. 692 I 
.948f 
.924? 
i l A T 5 C ? 
^ N J . J - > ^ * 
-25.869 \ 
.604 i 
.512 j 
-35 .803 
.999 
.998 
6.595 j2453.429 
, — - ' - ^ - — • • * • • • • 
- 1 6 3 -
i'ABLS A-4 
(con t inued) 
7) Manitoba: 
Level of 
N a t i o n a l 
Accounts 
Surplus 
\ Level of ;Expendi- (Subsidies 
, Current j t u r e s on j to the 
1 Accounts |Goods and Ip r iva t e 
Un employ-! -49 .486 
ment -1812.579 
Ra tes ; .303 
I Surplus iSe rv ices iSector i 
Growth 
Rate of 
GDP 
fa Popu-
l a r 
Vote 
fa 
Seats 
Election 
Year 
Time 
Since 
Election 
Time 
to 
Election 
High 
Popular 
Support 
i 
20.936 
1405.032 
.352 
10.734 
2491.680 
.195 
16.076 
75.361 
.015 
Majority 
Govern-
ment 
-111.588 
651.028 
.133 
-48.408 
3892.920 
.374 
19.829 
2957.402 
.342 
9.797 
5570.720 
.232 
-13.835 
454.56I 
.035 
-36.204 
1 707 
.016 
N- j 9 i S I 
27.982 
85.195 
.202 
-5.496 
102.874 
.473 
Capital 
Assis-
tance Ex-
penditures 
54.153 
3.707 
.243 
5.304 
11.062 
.285 
4.363 
4.009 
.214 
•34.285 
16.525 
«U3 
-8.949 
2.418 
."0*^ 2. 
3.476 ] 
3141.909 i 
.403 j 
-.226 I 
98.285 ! 
.021 ; 
-.068 I 
257.158 ] 
.038 ! 
-8.949 
519.810 
.535 
— - * • 
Constant 
R
 2 Adj. R^ 
P 
-479.193- -383.329 { 274.117 
.998 5 .999 ! 
.997! .999 
1036.5?3JJ2591.673 j 
.918 I 
.899 j 
48.693 t 
10.096) 
.6941 
#592 j 
-5 .762 
.998 
.997 
1180.577 
164-
TABLE A-4 
(continued) 
8) Saskatchewan: 
;T :T 
Unemploy-
ment 
Rate 
I Growth 
' Rate of 
i GDP 
• fa Popu-
j lar 
I Vote 
> fa 5 fa 
\ Seats 
] Election 
! Year 
\ 
\ Time 
Since 
Election 
j Time 
} to 
Election V 
I High 
Popular 
Support 
Level of Level of; Expendi- j Subsidies(Capital 
National s Current 
Accounts \ Accounts 
Surplus 
-40.114 
334.378 
.245 
-3.292 
205.242 
.048 
109.341 
1196.673 
.108 
-25.961 
9?4.223 
.207 
Surplus 
-40.792 
95.359 
.221 
97.775 
399.111 
.146 
-22.427 
324.598 
.106 
-42.838 
14.855 
.022 
-34.111 I -49.099 
267.392 111.847 
.207 .212 
5.862 j 
9.762 
.004 { 
Majority 
Govern-
ment 
Constant 
R
 2 Adj. R^ 
F 
-455.687 
1130.826 
.120 
-64.445 
135.71? 
.057 
-406.175 
262.367 
.279 
tures on \ to the jAssis-
Goods andj Private ', tance Ex-
Services ; Sector ; penditures 
15.405 i 
292.956 \ 
.238 ' 
-.224 
10.399 
.003 
1.978 
1225.807 
.297 
-24.515 
249.102 
.073 
-220.150 
2479.7211 
.385 
2658.348 ;-2377.743? 
.996 1 .985! 
.994] .977 
309.698 112.224 
.„„...i .-_. L 
67.412 
.997] 
.996 
755.931* 
-27.779 
2,321 
.088 
208.843 
11.077 
.380 
117.744 
.468 
.392 
3.883 
27.610 
.400 
.333 
47.254 
.182 
-4.738 
9.556 
.052 
.34.678 i 
88.068 I 
.278 j 
-5.473 ( 
13.683 1 
.029 I 
-6.074 j 
.941 5 
,914 j 
34.948 
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TABLE A-4 
(con t inued) 
9) A l b e r t a : 
1
 Level of 
National 
Accounts 
Surplus 
Level of j Expendi- j Subsidies 
Current j tures on jto the 
Accounts ; Goods andtPrivate 
Surplus ! Services Sectors 
Capital 
Assis-
tance Ex-
penditures 
Unemploy-
ment 
Rate 
Growth 
Rate of 
GDP 
fa Popu-
l a r 
Vote 
i 
Seats 
Election 
Year 
Time 
Since 
Election 
Time 
to 
Election 
High 
Popular 
Support 
Majority 
Govern-
ment 
Constant 
R 2
 2 Adj. R  j 
183.910 
13.034 
.066 
56.051 
11.799 
.422 
154.302 
1.918 
.064 
62.07? 
12.866 
.419 
-8.942 
3.285 
.055 
662.152 1 
1.642 j 
.049 j 
369.720 1 
3.573 
,0?8J 
X 
363.078! 
3.131? 
.061* 
9640284 -995.541 
.671 j .564 
..533 j .463j 
4.491 5.606* 
40.233 
4.266 
.118 
8.07? 
3.218 
.120 
-3.195 
3.796 
.024 
166.055 
3.68? 
.164 
47.815 
3.758 
.117 
53.418 
4.581 
.084 
248.492 
.627 
.403 
2.800 
1.54? 
11.436 
.310 
4.574 
30.730 
.014 
-1.248 
31.938 
.300 
38.820 
8.518 
.026 i 
\ 
15.050 j 
11.141 j 
.038 j 
13.008 j 
6.650 \ 
.088 
-35.926 ! 
5.464 | 
.028 j 
-29.362 j 
80447 * 
.092 
-105.921 *i 
.894 \ 
.787 j 
8.425 j 
,098 
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TABLE A-4 
(continued) 
10) British Columbia: 
Level of 
National 
Accounts 
Surplus 
Unemploy-
ment 
Rate 
Growth 
Rate of 
fa Popu-
lar 
Vote 
Seats 
Election 
Year 
Level of 
Current 
Accounts 
Surplus 
Time 
Since [ 
Election j 
Time 1 
to | 
Election j 
High I 
Popular | 
Support i 
Majority \ 
Govern- ; 
ment I 
Constant * 
R2
 2 1 Adj. R  / 
-212.830 
1.782 
.104 
-109.110 
3.10? 
.077 
Expendi- ! Subsidies(Capital 
tures on 
Goods and 
Services 
21.192 
4.419 
.227 
-215.732 
2.02? 
.116 
-109.836 
3.488 
.034 
343.374 j 
.182 
.065 
1,555 
3831553 
.199 
.085 
1.748, 
to the 
Private 
Sectors 
Assis-
1tance Ex-
penditures 
r 
294.675 
.227 ; 
.176 i 
4.41Q ( 
-1.492 
2.145 
.125 
47.033 
.125 
.067 j 
2.14S 
-.671 
6.416 
.252 
-.132 
6.686 
.154 
-1.424 
2.581 
.096 
1.522 
2.802 
.049 
25.403 
.551 
.402 
3,685 j 
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APPENDIX V 
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TABLS A-5 
Correlation of Federal-Provincial 'Coordination' of Policy 
by Policy Type to Political and Economic Conditions in the 
Provinces 
1) Level of Expenditures on Goods and Services: 
P r o v i n c e 
N f i d . 
P . E . I . 
N . S . 
N . B . 
Que . 
O n t . 
Man. 
S a s k . 
A l t a . 
B.C. 
n . a . : no 
Un
em
-
pl
oy
-
m
e
n
t 
Ra
te
 
. 367 
. 1 9 8 
. 207 
- . 1 9 0 
- . 5 8 1 
. 3 0 2 
. 3 1 6 
. 0 6 4 
. 0 6 8 
- . 1 5 1 
Gr
ow
th
 
Ha
te
 
o
f GD
P
 
. 1 4 0 
. 2 5 1 
. 3 5 2 
. 0 5 4 
. 1 9 5 
- . 5 3 2 
- . 0 1 7 
- . 0 5 4 
. 0 7 4 . 
. 3 0 3 
't a p p l i c a b l e 
H 
1 <=y 1 oj I 
<D > -rt O £ 
Xi rH O O CD O 
CD CC) H. C H -H 
tr, H. A* -H W +J 
- . 0 8 6 
- . 1 0 9 
. 1 7 3 
. 0 ? 1 
- . 0 3 2 
- . 0 7 8 
. 0 4 0 
n . a . 
- . 2 4 6 
- . 5 3 9 
Fe
de
-
r
a
l 
K 
le
c-
ti
on
 
- . 0 0 4 
- . 2 8 8 
. 254 
.087 
. 1 0 4 
- . 2 1 4 
. 202 
. 2 5 3 
- . 5 7 8 
- . 2 1 6 
Pr
ov
-
in
ci
al
 
El
ec
-
ti
on
 
.117 
- . 3 1 ? 
.222 
- . 4 2 2 
- . 0 1 2 
- . 1 5 ? 
- . 4 7 5 
.077 
.010 
" • ^  -' *^  
2) L e v e l 
P r o v i n c e 
N f i d . 
P . E . I . 
N . S . 
N .B . 
Que. 
Ont. 
Man. 
Sask . 
A l t a . 
B.C. 
o f Expend 
1 1 
E >>-P 4) 
« O C 4 ) 
C H 0) c3 
*3 ft S CC 
- . 0 3 1 
- . 2 8 1 
- . 3 9 3 
- . 0 3 9 
. 0 8 5 
. 0 1 6 
. 0 0 0 
. 1 2 5 
. 1 2 8 
- . 2 6 3 
i t u r e on 
Si 
4J 
% <D 
O P ^ 
H. C3 < H P 
-J> od 0 0 
. 4 9 6 
. 3 7 9 
. 239 
- . 1 8 2 
. 0 3 5 
- . 0 3 6 
- . 2 7 5 
- . 1 8 4 
. 1 3 2 
. 6 0 7 
S u b s i d i e s : 
1 
4) 
H 
=•* 1 05 1 
>•*• 0 c X) rH O O © O 
<L) 
fe 
CS H. q H H 
*H a* -H a -P 
- . 0 6 5 
- . 0 0 5 
. 2 2 5 
- . 4 4 0 
. 0 1 1 
. 0 2 0 
. 1 8 6 
n . a . 
. 6 5 4 
- . 5 9 0 
1 . 1 
CD O S 
xi H 0) 0 
0 J S H - H 
fe f n M 4 » 
. 3 8 8 
- . 2 6 2 
. 2 4 4 
- . 1 6 3 
. 3 5 9 
- . 2 7 4 
- . 2 7 6 
. 5 2 2 
. 3 5 4 
- . 3 0 6 
H 
I o5 1 
> -H C C 
O O CC O 
h C H - H 
{X -H A* 4-*> 
- . 2 3 8 
. 1 0 4 
.258 
. 0 7 5 
- . 3 1 6 
. 2 9 1 
. 178 
- . 4 0 3 
.422 
- . 3 1 2 
n.a.: not applicable 
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TABLE A-5 
(continued) 
3) Level of Expenditures on Capital Assistance 
i 
Province 
Nf id . 
P . E . I . 
N . S . 
N.B. 
Que. 
Ont . 
Man. 
Sask . 
A l t a . 
B.C. 
i 
O 
H 
ft 
e -p o) O C -P 
C <U C5 
.033 
.029 
- . 3 5 6 
- . 1 7 4 
,. .262 
- . 0 9 6 
- . 0 5 4 
- . 0 8 9 
- . 2 4 5 
- . 309 
v i 
Si 0 
4J 
& CD 
0 P rx, H. 05 Q 
c « o 
.113 
- . 4 6 2 
.074 
.o?o 
.089 
- . 1 2 6 
- . 1 1 6 
- . 0 6 5 
.190 
.182 
c 1 
H -rirH 03 t > W fl 
*•» O O 
O H. H -H 
TJ P-t CfS 4-> 
(D - H O 
fccg O «) 
- . 0 5 9 
.173 
- . 6 7 9 
- . 6 4 6 
- . 8 5 9 
- . 6 6 8 
.106 
n . a . 
-,7.65 
.093 
H O 
as -H 
H.-P 
<D O 
T ? Q> 
<D H 
&< &3 
- . 0 0 3 
.259 
- . 2 8 0 
- . 3 4 2 
- . 2 1 8 
- . 4 6 3 
- . 0 7 6 
.145 
- , 2 9 ? 
- . 3 1 3 
n.a.: not applicable 
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